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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the role of twentieth century southern sheriffs; specifically,
their role in southern racial violence and the Civil Rights Movement. Despite the
southern sheriffs central role in southern racial history, this local law enforcement
officer has attracted surprisingly little historical attention. And despite historians’
extensive studies of lynchings and racial violence in the South, they have remained
relatively quiet on the subject of sheriffs. This paper seeks to bring the southern sheriff to
the forefront o f southern racial history, for they provide a unique window into the South’s
history o f segregation, racism, and mob violence.
Part I examines the southern sheriffs central role in southern racial history from
Reconstruction to the early twentieth century. Some were members of the Ku Klux Klan,
participating in the lynching of African Americans, or at the very least, doing little to
hinder white mob violence. Many members o f their white communities often expected
them to “capably” enforce the social order and racial caste, while blocking racial progress
or equality. Without the complicity of their local sheriff, these lynchings might not have
occurred. In such cases, sheriffs played a central role in mob violence even if they did not
participate directly in the lynching itself.
Part II explores the activists who noted the central role o f southern sheriffs in
racial violence and attempted to expose and challenge southern sheriffs’ power. In the
late nineteenth century and the first few decades o f the twentieth, individuals like Ida B.
Wells and Arthur Raper, and organizations such as the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the Southern Commission on Lynching, and
the Association o f Southern Women for the Prevention o f Lynching (ASWPL), penned
their observations in pamphlets, bulletins, and flyers in order to increase public awareness
of the South’s law enforcement problem.
Part III focuses on James G. Clark o f Selma, Alabama, and Lawrence Rainey of
Philadelphia, Mississippi, two sheriffs of the Deep South whose violent attempts to
thwart African Americans’ pursuit of voting rights and desegregation attracted national
attention during the Civil Rights Movement. Valuable historical accounts o f the
Movement have focused on important leaders, major national organizations, and
significant events, but have never focused on sheriffs like Clark and Rainey, whose
extremist viewpoints and actions had a direct effect on the Movement’s goals and on how
events such as the Selma march unfolded.
This paper concludes that the passage o f the Voting Rights Act o f 1965 had an
immediate impact on the election o f the local sheriff and the demographics o f the
sheriffs office. Although the Voting Rights Act alone could not eradicate racism within
the southern sheriffs office, the bill dismantled the legal restraints that prevented black
southerners from voting, and allowed them to influence the choice o f sheriff.
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INTRODUCTION
“Sheriff John Brown always hated me
For what I don’t know
Ev’ry time I plant a seed
He said, ‘Kill it before it grows.’
He said, ‘Kill them before they grow.’
Freedom came my way one day
And I started out of town,
All o f a sudden I saw Sheriff John Brown
Aiming to shoot me down
So I shot, I shot, I shot him down
And I say, if I’m guilty I will pay.”
Lyrics from Bob Marley’s 1973 song, “I Shot the Sheriff’

The image of the southern sheriff as a big-bellied, slow-witted, Yankee-hating
racist in mirrored sunglasses remains one of America’s most enduring stereotypes; it
persists in television, movies, and fiction. The image has even become a metaphor for
descriptions of violent acts. A search for “southern sheriffs” on the Internet reveals news
stories such as, “zookeepers quickly responded to the attack o f the lions by turning on
three high-pressure fire hoses, like good southern sheriffs.. . . ” An examination of the
history of racial violence in the South from Reconstruction to the Civil Rights Movement
reveals the origin and the validity o f this stereotype. The image of the trigger-happy
sheriff most likely began in the 1890s when lynching reached its height but became fully
formed during the Civil Rights Movement, when accounts of sheriffs' actions appeared
not just in newspapers, but on national television. The nation watched aggressive
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southern sheriffs brutally thwart peaceful civil rights marches. Thus, the negative image
did not arise from Hollywood’s imagination or a writer’s whim. These club-wielding,
tobacco-chewing figures were anything but invented. Fictional depictions of the southern
sheriffs may seem exaggerated, but southern history offers many examples that fit the
stereotype.
For instance, on January 26, 1921, the Union, South Carolina Progress reported
the death o f James Gideon Long, who had served as Union County sheriff for twenty
years. “Former Sheriff Long,” the obituary read,
was widely known throughout this county and State, for he had served well his
State not only in the days of the Civil War, but in the even more troublous times
of Reconstruction days, when he did much to help restore white supremacy, he
having been the first man in this State to organize the now famous Ku Klux Klan
in South Carolina. At the request o f Former Sheriff Long, he was buried in his
Confederate uniform and in his hand was a small silk Confederate flag.1

Although J.G. Long served as sheriff during the late nineteenth century, the newspaper’s
tribute to him dramatically illustrates the role and status of twentieth century southern
sheriffs as well. Like Long, some were members of the Ku Klux Klan, participating in the
lynching of African Americans, or at the very least, doing little to hinder white mob
violence. Many members of their white communities often expected them to “capably”
enforce the social order and racial caste, while blocking racial progress or equality.
Newspapers frequently reported that a black prisoner was “taken from the sheriff’ or
“taken from jail” by an angry crowd, revealing how easily white mobs enacted the
southern ritual of extralegal justice. Without the complicity of their local sheriff, these

1

Long and Wilburn Family Papers, University o f South Carolina.
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lynchings might not have occurred. In such cases, sheriffs played a central role in mob
violence even if they did not participate directly in the lynching itself.
As Savannah, Georgia’s black newspaper noted at the height of the lynching
epidemic in 1892, “The success which almost invariably attends the efforts of such
lawless mobs, is nearly always the result o f collusion with the officers of the law, and
instances are not infrequent when sheriffs and jailors have been passive spectators, or
active participants in these deeds o f violence and blood.” According to estimates by the
NAACP, 5,200 blacks were burned, shot, or mutilated (or a combination thereof)
between 1890 and 1960. The death toll is most likely understated since in many cases
southern sheriffs and other local officials, themselves aiding and abetting the lynch mobs,
did not deem the murders significant enough to report. Although legal statutes, created
under Reconstruction-era civil rights laws and based on the Fourteenth Amendment,
authorized prosecutions o f public officials and law enforcement officers who committed
or conspired with others to commit acts o f racial violence, state and federal courts rarely
invoked these statutes. Fewer than one percent of lynch mob participants were ever
prosecuted.3
The NAACP noted that lynchings virtually disappeared from the southern
landscape by the 1950s. However, the southern values and attitudes that gave rise to
lynching remained, and when the Civil Rights Movement united African Americans to
challenge the racial status quo, renewed southern violence, and sheriffs’ acquiescence in
2 Quoted in Edward Ayers, Vengeance and Justice: Crime and Punishment in the 19th Century American
South (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 245.
3 Earl Ofari Hutchinson, “The Politics of Lynching,” Salon, 31 August 2000,
http://www.salon.com/news/feature/20Q0/08/31/lvnching (7 March 2001).
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it, was a likely response. Under the heading, “Why Lynching has Declined,” a 1959
article in the Crisis observed, “Today, the terror and intimidation function, served for so
many years by lynchings, has been assumed pretty much by law enforcement officers in
the rural and backwoods South.”4 “Judge Lynch” was replaced by a rash of civil rights
murders, the bombing of schools and churches, and the violent actions of southern
sheriffs and police squads. With disturbing regularity, southern sheriffs, the “peace
officers” responsible for quelling anti-civil rights violence, did anything but maintain
peace.
Despite the southern sheriffs central role in southern racial history, this local law
enforcement officer has attracted surprisingly little historical attention. And despite
historians’ extensive studies o f lynchings and racial violence in the South, they have
remained relatively quiet on the subject of sheriffs. This paper seeks to correct this
omission and bring the southern sheriff to the forefront of southern racial history. As Part
I reveals, southern sheriffs provide an invaluable illustration o f the slow— almost
imperceptible—progression toward racial equality and the continuity of racial violence
from Reconstruction to the Civil Rights Movement. By studying the most “virile” and
“esteemed” member of local government, the person once called the “barometer of public
opinion,” the southern racial perspective comes into clearer focus.
Part II explores the activists who attempted to expose and challenge southern
sheriffs’ power. In the late nineteenth century and the first few decades of the twentieth,
individuals like Ida B. Wells and Arthur Raper, and organizations such as the National

4

John A. Morsell, “States’ Rights and States’ Wrongs,” Crisis 66 (May 1959), 269.
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Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the Southern
Commission on Lynching, and the Association of Southern Women for the Prevention of
Lynching (ASWPL), noted the central role of southern sheriffs in racial violence. They
penned these observations in pamphlets, bulletins, and flyers in order to increase public
awareness of the South’s law enforcement problem, and the ASWPL in particular tried to
address the problem o f sheriffs’ complicity in lynching by sending each member to
obtain her local sheriffs signature on an anti-lynching petition.
Part III focuses on James G. Clark of Selma, Alabama, and Lawrence Rainey of
Philadelphia, Mississippi, two sheriffs of the Deep South whose violent attempts to
thwart African Americans’ pursuit o f voting rights attracted national attention during the
Civil Rights Movement. The sheriffs’ role in the Movement reveals that the passage of a
century had neither changed the support and protection that the sheriff received from
parts o f the white community and local officials, nor the prominent status of the office.
And, like some o f their predecessors, Clark and Rainey continued to serve as “defenders
o f the caste system.”
Valuable historical accounts of the Movement have focused on important leaders,
major national organizations, and significant events, but have never focused on those
sheriffs whose extremist viewpoints and actions had a direct effect on the Movement’s
goals and on how events such as the Selma march unfolded. For example, the Student
Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and the Southern Christian Leadership
Conference (SCLC) chose to begin their Alabama voter registration drive in Selma,
largely due to Sheriff Clark’s reputation as a violent reactionary. Martin Luther King
candidly admitted that the success o f the voting rights campaign depended in large part

7

on provoking violence. Clark was the individual that the campaign was trying to provoke.
While Sheriff Rainey did not have Clark’s national reputation, he played a significant
role in the killing and cover-up of the three rights workers. In addition, the subsequent
nationally-headlined FBI investigation exposed several other incidents of racial violence
linked to Rainey’s office.
Both men certainly represent the most egregious examples o f racist southern
sheriffs. Indeed, Clark and Rainey are most likely responsible for establishing the
stereotype of the southern sheriff. Through television broadcasts and newspaper
headlines, Clark and Rainey’s uncannily similar appearances provided the nation with
hundreds of vivid images of the southern sheriff as an overweight, tobacco-chewing, guntoting thug. But, it was their excesses that ultimately provoked voting reforms and made
the southern sheriffs office a position for caretakers of the law rather than of the color
line.
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i lyn c h in g m MS
I

party*

JP J7 H

®Ssr/i!S
•E."J— • /

L—

From The Crisis, January 1935, page 27.

Southern sheriffs have enjoyed an elevated community status since the inception
o f the office in the colonial era. In the mid-seventeenth century Chesapeake, the governor
selected sheriffs from an exclusive group of substantial landholders to serve for one or
two years. As large property owners, these men were already members o f a political and
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social elite, but their appointment to the shrievalty further increased their power and
importance within their communities. Similarly, as a 1960s study of the southern sheriffs
office argued, the mid-twentieth century sheriff, though elected on a partisan basis for a
four-year term, was “likely to be politically one of the most esteemed persons in the
county.”5 Especially in rural areas, an intricate web of family ties and local loyalties
bound citizens to law officers. Many o f the sheriffs white constituents viewed him as a
prestigious member of the community, in part because the machinery of local
government was otherwise weak, and in part because they were grateful and indebted to
the man largely responsible for maintaining the color line. Similar to the way in which
southern colonial courts insured respect for the office of sheriff by levying a fine or
publicly whipping anyone who abused the local sheriff, an early twentieth century
southern town might perceive the wounding or killing of their county sheriff, especially if
instigated by a black person, as an attack on the white community at large, and therefore,
in some cases, as license for public mob violence.6
The official responsibilities of the office of sheriff — preserving the peace,
enforcing the law, making arrests, supervising prisoners, operating jails, serving civil
processes, and collecting taxes— also remained much the same since the seventeenth
century. A few differences existed; for example, beginning in the early nineteenth
century, sheriffs were elected by their county’s voters, not appointed by the state
5 Dana B. Brammer and James E. Hurley, A Study o f the Office o f Sheriff in the United States, Southern
Region (Bureau of Governmental Research, University of Mississippi, 1968), 20.
6 Bruce Smith, Rural Crime Control (New York: Institute of Public Administration, Columbia
University, 1933), 43; C.H. Karracker, Seventeenth Century Sheriff (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1930), 66-69; W. Fitzhugh Brundage, Lynching in the New South: Georgia and Virginia,
1880-1930 (Urbana: University o f Illinois Press, 1993), 76-77; National Sheriffs’ Association
http://www.sheriffs.org/defaults/defaults s links.htm (14 March 2002).
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governor. The mid-twentieth century sheriff was no longer responsible for apprehending
fugitive slaves or managing elections, but instead acted in most states as the executive
officer of the state’s courts. Sheriffs furnished or served as bailiff, summoned witnesses,
and cared for jurors. Time did not alter the majority of the contemporary office’s duties,
and like his historical counterpart, the mid-twentieth century sheriff was the most “virile
part of county government.” Beginning in the late nineteenth century, industrialization
and urbanization led many cities to establish their own law enforcement agency. In some
counties, the sheriff would leave municipal law enforcement to municipal police
departments while he served the rural areas. However, despite a jurisdictional distinction
between the city police force and the sheriff and his deputies, sheriffs remained the
South’s chief law enforcement officers.7
Just as the elevated status and official responsibilities o f the sheriffs office have
survived the passage o f centuries, so has evidence of corruption within the position.
Abuse of the office began almost immediately upon its inception in the colonies. A
commentator on the office in North Carolina declared that “no other single officer in the
county exercised such plenary executive and administrative powers as did the colonial
sheriff. Nor did any other officer make for misrule quite so much as the sheriff.” One
scholar has argued that the limited tenure of the colonial office was not based on
democratic doctrines, but on the premise that the sheriffs office encompassed duties that
were easily susceptible of abuse. Indeed, numerous complaints of corruption in the
sheriffs office prompted reform legislation in Maryland in 1678. This legislation limited
7 “most virile part”: Brammer, 1-2, 20; National Sheriffs’ Association
http://www.sheriffs.org/defaults/defaults s links.htm (14 March 2002).
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the sheriff to a single one-year term unless a certificate from county court attested to the
“honest and efficient execution o f office during the preceding year.”

o

Two duties in particular rendered the office vulnerable to scandal. As the local
tax collector, the sheriff held a desirable and highly lucrative position, for in many
counties the sheriff was authorized to keep ten percent of the taxes he collected as his
personal poundage. Extortions, embezzlement, and irregular settlements with the county
treasurer were common. Furthermore, as manager of local elections, the sheriff had a
powerful political influence. Expected to be impartial, sheriffs were not allowed to vote
in elections over which they presided except to break a tie, but they possessed
considerable ability to influence the outcome o f elections. The sheriff opened and closed
the poll when he pleased, sometimes ignoring the pleas of a candidate who wanted to
keep it open until more voters arrived. He set the day for the election, often taking into
consideration which day would best suit his favored candidates. He had the right to
decide whether individual voters were properly qualified, and in some cases, voter
qualifications could be based solely on the political whims of the sheriff. In a 1756
election in Augusta County, Virginia, for example, the sheriff was accused of denying a
vote to those Freeholders who did not select his preferred candidate. However, even
when he supervised an election with decorum and fairness, the power of the sheriff made
an impartial vote rather challenging. Each voter had to declare his vote to the sheriff, and
if the sheriff was known to favor a particular candidate, some voters might have been
unduly swayed by the man sitting before them. Not surprisingly, the sheriffs control over

Smith, 44-45; Karracker, 86-88.
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the conduct of elections was thus so complete that he was frequently able to return to the
colonial Assembly the person o f his choice rather than that o f the electorate.9
Although supplemented with court-commissioned slave patrols by the
Revolutionary era, the county sheriff was also responsible for enforcing fugitive slave
laws. In late seventeenth century South Carolina, for example, lawmakers attempted to
restrain the growing slave population with the 1690 “Act for the Better Ordering of
Slaves,” which mandated that the entire white population was required to act as a
community police force and apprehend runaways. These captured slaves would then be
turned over to their owners or to the local sheriff. In contrast, the Virginia legislature
realized that the white community alone could not catch enough fleeing bondsmen, and
ordered sheriffs to raise whatever force appeared necessary to apprehend fugitive
slaves.10
Corruption in the southern sheriffs office in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries revolved primarily around abuses o f an economic and political nature, but
beginning in the post-Reconstruction South, abuses became more apparent within the
social— or, more specifically, racial— fabric of southern society. It is not surprising that
the ffeedmen recognized little difference between the legal violence inflicted upon them
by slave patrollers and the extralegal violence used by white law enforcement officials
and the “offspring” o f the patrol, the Ku Klux Klan, formed in 1865. Certainly, a fine line
separated the patrols from the latter two groups, both of which simply replaced their

9 Charles S. Sydnor, American Revolutionaries in the Making{New York: Free Press, 1968), 24-25, 6869.
10

Hadden, 17-18,28.
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predecessor in the quest for black subordination, except after emancipation, restraints
upon mobility, socialization, and property ownership were achieved without official legal
sanction, and with more violence. Former slaves claimed that sheriffs and the Klan
worked simultaneously with patrollers, or described the brutality of each group
interchangeably. Thus, the ffeedmen’s inability to detect the transition from legal to
extralegal violence not only provides the most telling indication of the patrol’s violent
legacy, but speaks again to the acquiescence of southern sheriffs in upholding the
antebellum racial regime.11
The abolition of slavery forced some southern whites to rely increasingly upon
extralegal measures in order to ensure the political, economic, and social subordination of
their former bondsmen. Historians of the South have noted that in contrast to the North,
where accelerated economic development and urban growth promoted the creation of
courts and law enforcement agencies that worked to preserve social order and suppress
violence, the South did not develop comparable institutions to discourage disorder.
Furthermore, while the ethos of “dignity” and self-restraint prevailed in the North, the
South adhered to an ethic of “honor” and had a long tradition o f “self-help,” a willingness
to use violence without waiting for an official legal sanction. Historian Edward Ayers
argues that the ethic of honor not only influenced relationships within white society, but
dictated the color line, requiring blacks’ unfeigned deference to whites. When honor was
breached— as evidenced by a display of disobedience or even an “uppity” glance—
southerners preferred that honor be rectified through personal, or extralegal, justice rather

11

Hadden, 28, 40, 211-16.
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than through the impersonal third party of the state. Thus, honor, slavery, and the residual
frontier system entwined in the South to create a wariness of powerful legal institutions
and caused many to doubt the value of centralized justice and law enforcement.

10

However, southerners did not doubt the value of local law enforcement, for a
sheriff, as “caretaker o f the color line” and “defender of the caste system,” generally
shared the racial attitudes o f his white constituents, who expected their local sheriff to
enforce, or at least not ignore, a community’s insistence upon the preservation of white
supremacy.13 In the South, public opinion counted far more heavily than the law, and no
one was more influenced by public sentiment than the county sheriff. A sheriff did not
like to offend a white voter if it could be helped. He knew that his ability to subordinate
the black population, or “keep them in their place,” was a “political asset,” an “informal
obligation” of his position.14 Beginning in the post-Reconstruction South, the elected
nature o f the sheriffs office became a particularly noticeable liability, for during a time
when racial disorder in the South demanded the intervention of law enforcement, many
sheriffs adhered to the will o f the majority rather than the rule of the law.

12 Edward Ayers, Vengeance and Justice: Crime and Punishment in the 19th Century American South
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984). See Chapter on “Honor and its Adversaries.” Bertram WyattBrown, Southern Honor: Ethics and Behavior in the Old South (New York: Oxford University Press,
1982). See Chapter 14: “Honor, Shame, and Justice in a Slavocracy.” Philip Dray, At the Hands o f Persons
Unknown: The Lynching o f Black America (New York: Random House, 2002), 30-31; Sally E. Hadden,
Slave Patrols: Law and Violence in Virginia and the Carolinas (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
2001), 208.
13 John Dittmer, Black Georgia in the Progressive Era, 1900-1920 (Urbana: University o f Illinois Press,
1977), 139.
14 Allison Davis, Burleigh B. Gardner, and Mary R. Gardner, Deep South: A Social Anthropological
Study o f Caste and Class (Chicago: University o f Chicago, 1941; 2d ed. abridged, Phoenix Books, 1965),
287.
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Reconstruction and the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment raised black expectations, but the semblance o f equal justice that they
achieved proved short-lived. For example, black men held federal, state, and local public
offices, including the office of sheriff, but the overthrow of the last Radical
Reconstruction governments in 1877 ended this brief effort at achieving racial equality.15
Furthermore, economic dependence, political setbacks, and unpunished white violence
took their toll. Southern racial codes, habits, and customs could not be changed by “paper
laws.” Instead, the South adhered to what one Mississippi lawyer deemed “negro law,” a
law about which “no book on earth [could] shed the faintest ray o f light, but had to be
learned by experience and observation.” For example, if a black person killed a white
man, according to “negro law” he would suffer death “in some form or other, the time,
place, and manner o f his execution depending altogether on who caught him, the sheriffs
posse or the friends of the deceased.”16 Often maintained through violence, the southern
racial code and the reassertion o f white power over black lives were nowhere more
evident than in the acquiescence o f sheriffs in enforcing white supremacy.
By the late 1880s, when the wave o f racial violence in the South climaxed, the
collusion o f sheriffs and other law enforcement officials with lynchers became such a
problem that after 1892 a number of states adopted legislative or constitutional provisions
designed to end this public ritual o f racial violence. For example, in 1901 the Alabama
Constitution stated that “whenever any prisoner is taken from jail, or from the custody of
15 Eric Foner, Freedom’s Lawmakers: A Directory o f Black Officeholders During Reconstruction (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1993), xi, xv. During Reconstruction, especially in counties with a sizable
black population, blacks held some local offices. There were at least 41 black sheriffs.
16 Leon Litwack, Trouble in Mind: Black Southerners in the Age o f Jim Crow (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, l 998), 230.
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any sheriff or his deputy and put to death or suffers grievous bodily harm, owing to the
neglect, connivance, cowardice, or other grave fault o f the sheriff, such sheriff may be
impeached.”17 However, measures such as these were largely ineffective, in part because
“paper laws” could not withstand the pressure of southern custom.
Southern sheriffs also played a prominent role in involuntary servitude. Peonage,
like lynching, was a legacy of slavery, and stemmed from the ideological conviction that
blacks only understood force, whether expressed through the rope and faggot or the
coercion of debt. This system o f debt servitude, which lasted well into the twentieth
century, offered a means o f controlling black laborers by ensuring that agricultural
laborers would remain mired in debt and thus deprived of mobility. Southern sheriffs
could thwart even their smallest efforts to leave a region that offered them little, if any,
cash income. According to Junius Gaten, a black man who moved from the South to
Chicago in 1905, southern sheriffs burned copies of the Chicago Defender, the nation’s
largest black newspaper and the first to urge southern blacks to move to the North,
because “they didn’t want people finding out about Chicago and freedom.” Copies o f the
paper were therefore carefully guarded, and porters on the Illinois Central Railroad,
which ran from Chicago’s Michigan Avenue to the Black Belt of the South, sneaked
copies o f the Defender for their family in the South. Gaten noted that these copies “would
be passed from hand to hand until the pages were all raggedy, falling apart.” 18

17 James Harmon Chadboum, Lynching and the Law (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1933; reprint, New York: Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1970), 64.
18 Ron Grossman, “Exodus to Freedom: Southern Blacks Found Haven Here,” Chicago Tribune, 12 Feb.
1995, p. C-l.
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Although not always enforced, laws existed that penalized a laborer for
abandoning his job after signing a contract. By 1907, nearly every southern state
legislature had passed a contract-labor measure that resembled the black codes of
Reconstruction. Under such laws, if a laborer abandoned his job after signing a contract,
he could be arrested for a criminal offense. In some cases, one could be arrested for
simply being black and unemployed. As the Virginia Bulletin noted in 1937, “In
Greenville, South Carolina the planters have requested the law enforcement officers to
round up all unemployed, able-bodied men and prosecute them for vagrancy if they
refuse cotton-picking jobs.”19 As this quote illustrates and as historian Pete Daniels
asserts, collusion between sheriffs and planters was common throughout the South. While
state and local law favored employers, peonage stemmed more from custom than law,
and was often reinforced by violence.20
The story o f James Felton, a victim o f peonage, not only indicates the extreme
violence which black laborers suffered, and the vague, at times imperceptible, distinction
between slavery and debt servitude, but the collusion o f sheriffs and planters in keeping
the “free” black population enslaved. Felton’s affidavit to the Georgia state authorities in
1926 revealed a common practice. Sheriffs would arrest vagrant black laborers, hold
them in jail until the planter arrived, and then allow the employer to handle his
“employee” however he chose. Felton said that five black laborers were killed after
attempting to escape from “Dr. King’s” farm. The sheriff and his deputies brought them
19

NAACP Papers, Part 10, 16:466.

20 Pete Daniels, The Shadow o f Slavery: Peonage in the South, 1901-1969 (Urbana: University of Illinois
Press, 1972); William Cohen, At Freedom’s Edge: Black Mobility and the Southern White Quest for Racial
Control, 1861-1915 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1991).
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back, telling King, “Here are these sons o f bitches that tried to get away from you; take
them back and give them what they need.” Felton reported that they were then given
severe beatings, and that the next day, Dr. King said he ‘“ was afraid to keep them, they
weren’t any good except to try to get away and he thought he’d better do away with
them.’ He then shot one, killed one with an axe, John Dowdy [his black overseer] killed
one with an axe, and Dr. King’s nephew shot two. I saw all of these killings and had to
help take the bodies to be buried.” Asserting that the servitude practiced on the farm was
known to the county sheriff who frequently visited the place, Felton noted bitterly, “Even
the public officials o f this town seem to be hired or working for Dr. King, as all seem to
take orders from him.”21 By aiding the preservation o f the peonage system, the sheriff
functioned as an “agent o f the planter” rather than as an agent o f the law.

That is,

because sheriffs did not recognize the blacks’ freedom but adhered to the legacy of
bondage, peonage victims could not expect to receive help from their local law
enforcement official.
Similarly, just as the sheriff often ignored local evidence of peonage, he turned a
blind eye to the composition of an angry crowd. In order for extralegal justice to function
effectively in the South, a reciprocal relationship had to exist between the sheriff and his
community. They protected each other from punishment for their extralegal activities,
becoming partners in the crimes conducted in the name of law and order. A state or local
political leader rarely chose to condemn a lynching, for like the sheriff, he, too, was an
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elected official ever-conscious of his constituents’ racial attitudes and their obvious
influence upon his political career. As the President’s Committee on Civil Rights,
appointed by President Harry Truman in 1946, wrote in their report, “Punishment of
lynchers is not accepted as the responsibility o f state or local governments in these
[southern] communities. Frequently, state officials participate in the crime, actively or
passively.” However, on the rare occasion when a governor or other political leader
attempted to punish a sheriff for ignoring his sworn duty to protect all prisoners, the
sheriffs community responded by refusing to bring indictments against him, or at least
swearing to their sheriffs outstanding leadership and judgment.
Not only were state political leaders often indifferent toward or reluctant to
condemn the South’s extralegal activity, but some southern whites simply refused to
punish their sheriff for upholding the color line, an act they deemed praiseworthy. Few
southern whites questioned their sheriffs interpretation of his duty to maintain public
order as a license to summarily punish or abuse blacks. Rather, they felt a sense of debt
and obligation to the man responsible for much of the violence that defined black
degradation. The sheriff reciprocated his constituents’ allegiance by refusing to identify
the members of a mob, noting that he “did not recognize” any of them, or that he had “no
information as to the identity” of the lynchers. Mob members felt confident that their
sheriff would not interfere with their violent purpose, for as Walter White wrote in 1918
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during his tenure as president of the NAACP, law enforcement officers were “all too
frequently in sympathy with the lynchers.”24
The lynching of Edward Johnson, a black man accused o f raping a young white
girl in Chattanooga, Tennessee, in 1906 and the subsequent arrest of Sheriff Joseph Shipp
vividly illustrate the bonds o f mutual obligation shared by a community and its sheriff,
and similarly, the protection and prestige sheriffs received when they upheld their
“informal obligation” of enforcing white supremacy. The day before Johnson was to be
legally executed, U.S. Supreme Court Justice John Marshall Harlan announced that the
court would hear Johnson’s appeal on the grounds that he had been denied his
constitutional rights by a careless defense and a perfunctory conviction. The Chattanooga
News printed word of the appeal and the ensuing stay of execution late that same day, and
as a result, within hours, twelve men broke into Johnson’s jail cell and killed him by
hanging and shooting him. Although Sheriff Shipp and Deputy Sheriff Jeremiah Gibson
had not participated in the lynching, the Supreme Court found them guilty o f contempt o f
court, as the appeal had granted Johnson federal prisoner status. As Chief Justice Melville
Fuller wrote in the court’s majority opinion, “Shipp’s failure to make the slightest
preparation to resist the mob, and his failure to make any reasonable effort to save
Johnson or identify the members o f the mob, justify the inference of a disposition upon
his part to render it easy for the mob to lynch Johnson, and to acquiesce in the
lynching.”25
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In other words, despite the fact that there had been many lynching threats even
before the case had been brought to the Supreme Court, Shipp and his deputy had left the
jail unguarded. Countering Shipp’s argument that mob violence was not expected, Fuller
called such an assertion “unreasonable and inconsistent with statements made by Sheriff
Shipp and his deputies that they were looking for a mob on the next day.” Continuing to
assert his innocence, or perhaps simply offer a justification for the actions of Johnson’s
lynchers, Shipp used a common defense. Southerners often blamed lynching on the
inefficiency of the southern court system, arguing that it contained so many delays and
procedural defects that lynch law was the only recourse to ensure justice. As Shipp
himself told the Birmingham Age-Herald, “The people o f Hamilton County were willing
to let the law take its course, until it became known that the case would not probably be
disposed of for four or five years by the Supreme Court. The people would not submit to
this, and I do not wonder at it.”26 Agreeing with the opinion of his Chattanooga
constituents, Shipp believed that there was not only a proper time for legal procedure, but
a right time for extralegal justice.
This case marked the first time that a white citizen, let alone a law enforcement
officer, was jailed for acquiescence in a black lynching. However, Shipp and his fellow
defendants were only imprisoned for ninety days, and in smaller print under the headline
o f “Sheriff Shipp Now in Washington Jail,” the New York Times noted their “pleasant
prison quarters” and that the “first men in jail for contempt of United States Supreme
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Court even have Private Bath.” The article observed that these Tennessee men were
housed in the most “humanitarian” part of the jail: the brand new female prison quarters.
Detailing the room’s measurements, the configuration of furniture, the private bathroom,
and the “four large circular windows” that gave “excellent views,” the journalist also
described Shipp’s nonchalant, relaxed approach to his confinement: “Sitting on his straw
bed, half reclining on his pillow of straw, Captain Shipp made this statement: ‘We are
very well pleased with the treatment given us by Warden McKee, and are delighted with
the quarters assigned us.’”

97

If the Times expressed surprise and veiled contempt at the prisoners’ privileged
treatment, Shipp’s community, though distraught that their respected sheriff was
imprisoned at all, expressed “relief’ and approval over the lightness o f his sentence.
According to the local press, Shipp, whose constituents had recently reelected him by the
largest majority ever given a Hamilton County Democrat, “went to his imprisonment
with the full confidence o f the people o f this county.” As an editorial in the Chattanooga
Times noted, the stigma typically attached to a jail sentence would be eliminated in
Shipp’s case, for in the eyes of a “large number” of his constituents, he was not guilty.
When Shipp and the other five defendants left to receive their sentence in Washington,
crowds lining the streets applauded them, and in the courtroom, a throng of friends “sat
as close as they could get” to Shipp and company, and then followed them to the jail,
providing special bedding and “every other possible arrangement for their comfort.” For
those who had to rely on local newspaper reports, the incorrect story that Shipp took his
conviction “very much to heart,” and that “he had dropped dead when he received his
27
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sentence . . . caused much excitement until it was proved untrue.” In fact, the opposite
occurred. The Chattanooga Times reported that Shipp’s “erect figure and striking
countenance attracted to him the greatest attention. He was without showing o f emotion
and heard his sentence without a quaver.”28
Chattanooga’s city council members sent Shipp and his associates telegrams of
sympathy, and over five thousand people, including the mayors of several Tennessee
cities, signed petitions requesting Shipp’s pardon from President Taft. Some requested
the pardon not because of the sheriffs prominent position or his presumed innocence, but
because they feared the effect of the sentence on white women’s safety. Just as an
editorial in the local paper worried that the Supreme Court’s decision might give the
Negro “license to exploit his vices,” indulging carelessly in “his bestial tastes,” concerned
citizens from Georgia mimicked this familiar cry of the protection of white womanhood,
expressing their “grave fear the effect that the fulfillment o f the sentence will have upon
the ignorant and irresponsible negroes, increasing beyond question the danger to the
women of the South.” In addition, because Shipp was a Confederate veteran, his
conviction gained him further support and sympathy. A former Confederate general,
calling attention to the loyalty of former Confederate soldiers to the government and
criticizing the imprisonment of former Sheriff Shipp, ordered every veterans’ camp in
Arkansas to prepare petitions to President Taft asking for Shipp’s pardon.29
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In stark contrast to Shipp, who received community support when he surrendered
a prisoner to the mob, a sheriff who warded off a mob was almost certain to face
condemnation from his community. Punishment often arrived through the power of the
vote, for a sheriffs constituents could voice their criticism by ensuring his defeat for
reelection. For example, in Carroll County, Georgia, in 1901, Sheriff Joseph Merrill
attracted national attention by opening fire on a mob that attacked the county jail. The
black prisoner, accused of killing a young white boy, was sentenced to death, but on the
day o f the scheduled hanging, an appeal to the Supreme Court delayed his execution. A
large crowd had come to town to witness the hanging, and upon learning of the delay,
they “crystallized in the formation of a mob” and assaulted the jail. They demanded that
Merrill hand them the key to the prisoner’s cell, but Merrill refused to comply with their
request and warned them that shots would be fired if they did not leave the building.
Despite his orders, they advanced down the corridor, and when one of Merrill’s deputies
killed a member o f the mob, the “unexpected fight of the sheriff’ caused the crowd’s
retreat. Merrill’s “reward” for checking the mob and standing up to southern tradition
was defeat in the next election. However, a Georgia congressman brought Merrill’s brave
stand to the attention of Theodore Roosevelt, who found him a job as custodian o f the
federal prison grounds in Atlanta. Roosevelt later requested that the Attorney General
ensure that the director o f the prison grant Merrill a promotion.30
In some cases, however, even those sheriffs who wanted to uphold their oath of
office were unable to quell a mob. Because lynch mobs included members o f the “county
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seat elites” who controlled local political life, the influence and will of the community
sometimes seemed an insurmountable obstacle. It was the presence of these “men of
property” that “tipped the balance” against sheriffs who sought to buck southern
tradition, and the sheriff simply submitted to what appeared inevitable. For example, in
1906, one peace officer noted that he “went into that cell block with every intention of
fulfilling my oath and protecting that man, but when the mob opened the door, the first
half a dozen men standing there were leading citizens—businessmen, leaders of their
•

churches and the community—I just couldn’t do it.”

^1

Community support for a lynching, whether endorsed by “men o f property” or
not, threatened a sheriff’s capacity to protect a black prisoner. Sheriff W.M Waltrip tried
to protect two black prisoners who had been accused o f arson in Franklin County,
Alabama, in 1891 but refused to sacrifice his own life when protection seemed useless.
While informing the governor that he was “heartily opposed to mob law,” he admitted to
the community’s victory, noting that the “hanging o f these firefiends has the endorsement
o f the larger portion o f the people, black and white, o f this county.” Thirty years later, the
Nation printed a similar story o f a lynching in Nodena County, Arkansas. Plans for a
black prisoner’s execution had been widely published, but Sheriff Dwight Blackwood
made no attempt to prevent the lynching, for “nearly every man, woman and child in our
county wanted the Negro lynched. When public sentiment is that way, there isn’t much
chance left for the officers.” Blackwood and his predecessor may have simply feared
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political suicide rather than physical danger, but regardless o f their primary motivation
for surrendering the prisoners, the will of the community prevailed.
The stories o f Merrill and Waltrip illustrate that not all southern sheriffs condoned
extralegal justice; many attempted to protect their prisoners and judiciously enforce the
law. Sheriffs like Merrill and Shipp represent opposite ends of the spectrum, but they
nevertheless offer similar insights into the southern racial system and sheriffs’ role in it.
Since the inception o f the office in the colonial era, the sheriff held a prominent status
within the white southern community. As tax collector, local election manager, and
enforcer o f fugitive slave laws, for example, the sheriff was an influential, powerful, and
often corrupt figure. Beginning in the post-Reconstruction South, corruption within the
office extended to the racial fabric of southern society, as many members o f the white
community expected their local law enforcement officer to ensure continued black
subordination.
When sheriffs like Merrill attempted to defend a black prisoner, they blatantly
defied such expectations and the “informal obligation” o f their position. That is, in order
for extralegal justice to function effectively, a reciprocal relationship had to exist between
a sheriff and those members of the white community who endorsed mob violence. They
became partners in enforcing the racial caste system. If a sheriff tried to avert a lynching,
he upset the balance, or reciprocity, and thus forfeited the prestige and power ascribed to
his office. Conversely, if as in Shipp’s case, a sheriff left a jail unguarded or ignored an
angry mob, many of his white constituents protected him from punishment. Therefore,
community support for a lynching typically dictated the sheriffs response. Disregarding
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his own viewpoint regarding mob violence, the sheriff was heavily influenced by public
opinion and knew that his ability to uphold the color line was a political asset.
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PART II
ACTIVISM: EXPOSING AND CHALLENGING SOUTHERN SHERIFFS’ POWER

“How does it come about that these mobs, composed invariably of white men and none
others, cannot be put down by the white authorities? .. .the sheriffs upon whom the
custody of such persons depends are chosen by popular election, and usually have no
backbone... there are few cases where a determined sheriff, armed and ready to do his
duty, could not quell a mob.”
Historian Albert Bushnell Hart, The Southern South, 1912

In the late nineteenth century, activists began to condemn southern sheriffs’
central role in racial violence, expressing horror at the South’s “growing disregard of
human life.” Ida Wells-Bamett, an African American who achieved national and
international fame as a journalist, public speaker, and community activist, launched an
anti-lynching campaign in the 1890s after “there came a lynching in Memphis which
changed the whole course o f my life.”33 Law enforcement officers in Memphis,
Tennessee, allowed a white mob to take three of her closest friends from jail and lynch
them. While certainly recognizing that lynching was not just a southern phenomenon,
Wells-Bamett’s writings focused on southern examples of mob mle and sheriffs’
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acquiescence in it. Her target audience was those “men and women of the South who
disapprove of lynching,” for supporters o f mob rule most likely would not have listened
to the words of a black woman, a member o f the very race whose subjugation they
enforced. Thus, Wells criticized those who quietly disapproved but failed to act, deeming
them “accomplices . . . equally guilty with the actual law-breakers.” She reminded them
that their “silence encourages a continuance o f this sort o f horror” and that endorsers of
extralegal measures would “persist” as long as they knew that they would “never be
called to an account.” In part, this confidence was sustained because the “moral support
o f those chosen by the people to execute the law, is frequently given to the support of
lawlessness and mob violence.”34
Wells criticized the mockery of justice that existed in the South, a land where race
was more powerful than law, where criminal accusations, arrests, and verdicts were based
less on evidence of guilt than on the skin color o f the defendant. Sheriffs were bound to
execute the decrees o f the law, not the racially-driven whims o f the community, but
“submission to mob reign” rather than protection of prisoners typically ruled. Lynchings
commonly began when defendants were “taken from the sheriff’ or “given to the mob by
the sheriff,” and any attempts to stop mob rule were feeble if they occurred at all. As
Wells illustrates with numerous examples, mobs could have been dispersed, but the
sheriff would “insist that no violence be done,” or would not “lift a hand to stop the
proceedings after the jail door yielded.”35
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Furthermore, Wells noted, the sheriff and his constituents each protected the
extralegal actions o f the other, refusing to break the unspoken code of silence that
preserved white supremacy. For example, when a black family was brutally shot in
Arkansas, the local paper detailed the circumstances leading up to the attack. Six months
after this publication, a resident o f Chicago wrote to find out if any of the parties
involved in the killing had been arrested. He received a signed reply from the county
sheriff, who briefly stated that “the parties have never been arrested, and are still in the
county. It was done by some of the citizens, and those who know will not tell.”36 The
sheriffs willingness to reply to an outside inquiry at all perhaps suggests his desire to
explain that public attitudes made it impossible for him to apprehend the criminals.
However, Wells believed that the sheriffs reply revealed his support o f the lynching, or
at least his apathetic unwillingness to question the rule o f the mob.
Wells believed that the success of her campaign would be marked not so much by
better law enforcement or national anti-lynching legislation, as by a change in public
opinion. By speaking forthrightly about mob violence, and by detailing lurid lynchings,
she could boldly intervene in public discourse and reach the white people o f the country
who possessed the power, authority, and resources to stop such “demonstrations of
American barbarism.”37 Certainly, the legal history of anti-lynching activities indicates
the practicality of her goals, for state efforts to end extralegal justice were largely
ineffective, and on a national level, Congress failed to pass the Blair Bill, the Dyer Bill,
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or any other legislation that would stem the tide of violence. However, the significance of
her writings lies in their primacy, for she was the first publicly to place mob violence on
the American agenda. Later, groups such as the Commission on Interracial Cooperation
(CIC), the Southern Commission on the Study o f Lynching, and the Association of
Southern Women on the Prevention of Lynching (ASWPL) added collective resistance to
her single voice. These groups did not change laws either, but they succeeded in forcing
national attention to and debate o f the issues.
The CIC, organized in 1920 by Will Alexander, a white Methodist minister from
Tennessee, never sought to challenge segregation or advocate racial equality, but to bring
moderate leaders o f both races together in an organization that advocated improved
housing, equal educational opportunities, and an end to mob violence. After a year of
effort, Alexander proclaimed that racial tensions had been reduced in places where the
CIC had worked. However, in the fall of 1930, Alexander decided that the CIC strategy
of local interracial committees was foundering. Although lynching had slowly declined
since the year of the commission’s founding, in 1930, the lynching rate doubled.
Alexander decided to reinvigorate the commission’s anti-lynching drive by replacing
local activism with research, documenting the region’s ills and challenging white
southern intellectuals’ traditional defense of regional institutions and mores. Obviously,
lynching, the violent outgrowth of white supremacy, one of the South’s most enduring
ideologies, was a prime topic for these new southern sociologists. At the height of the
lynching epidemic in the late nineteenth century, the Tuskegee Institute and the NAACP
had begun collecting and publicizing lynching statistics, but the CIC wanted to broaden
such research by examining the social origins of extralegal racial violence. The group
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hoped that exposing the realities behind the myths of lynching would serve as an
effective means o f eliminating the most extreme form o f racial violence. Therefore, it
established the Southern Commission on the Study of Lynching and chose sociologist
Arthur Raper to fulfill the task.38
Raper’s work has remained the standard text on the subject, and certainly, his
analysis of the common characteristics of mob members, lynched victims, and the
counties involved provided an important first look at salient facts of the epidemic. What
historians have generally overlooked, however, is his analysis o f sheriffs’ collusion with
mobs and the influence of political considerations on their actions. In the first chapter of
The Tragedy o f Lynching, “Facts about Lynching in 1930,” Raper included a section on
county sheriffs and their deputies, noting that “in most cases the sheriff and his deputies
merely stood by while the mob did its work.” Some did not even try to disguise their
complacency behind claims that the mob had taken them by surprise or that they were
unwilling to shoot into the crowd for fear o f killing innocent men, women, and children.
One Georgia sheriff noted that he was glad that the “damn nigger” was dead. “Except for
my oath and bond,” he added, “I’d have killed him myself as soon as they brought him
within shooting distance of the jail.”39
Furthermore, Raper noted the bonds o f obligation that existed between a sheriff
and his community. As Raper illustrated in one o f his chapters, a case study entitled,
“Sheriff Keeps Faith With Mob,” sheriffs not only failed to resist the mob, but also
f
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feigned ignorance as to the identities of the mob members. Following a lynching in
Thomasville, Georgia, in 1930, the sheriff reported under oath to a grand jury that he did
not recognize a single member o f the “party or parties . . . responsible for [the Negro’s]
death.” In response, the coroner’s jury commended their sheriff for the “quiet and orderly
manner” in which he handled the angry crowd, and for upholding his duty “in every
respect.”40
In stark contrast to such praise, Raper noted, was the open condemnation sheriffs
received when they defied the will o f the community. When an Ocilla, Georgia, sheriff
somehow disobeyed the instructions of the mob who had asked him to “take charge” of a
prisoner, his car was fired upon, and a bullet hole ruptured the car’s gas tank. In another
Georgia case, a sheriff, trying to prevent mob violence at a prisoner’s trial, persistently
pretended ignorance of the date the man would be tried. When the sentence had been
given and the prisoner removed, many local citizens expressed open criticism o f the
sheriff for not letting “the people” know when the prisoner would be brought before the
court.
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Raper attributed the characteristic indifference as well as the uncharacteristic
concern of peace officers to the “influence o f political consideration.” Elected by the
local people, sheriffs usually conformed their official acts to the expressed desires o f the
local electorate. And since mob members were nearly all voters, and the victim and most
members of his race were politically impotent, sheriffs adhered to the wishes of his
constituency. Raper noted that while the National Guard could be instrumental in
40 Ibid., 242.
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preventing mob outbreaks, sheriffs’ refusal to request the Guard’s aid rendered such
outside intervention typically futile. He concluded that a state would have to exercise
more power over its counties in order to stem the tide o f lynchings, for the local
representative—the county sheriff—was inhibited by the power of the ballot.42
In addition to the Southern Commission, Alexander formed an interrelated
Commission o f Law School Deans to study the legal aspects o f lynching. Building and
expanding upon Raper’s work, James Chadboum, a law professor at the University of
North Carolina, published Lynching and the Law in 1933. As well as suggesting “model
ouster laws” which could function as an important anti-lynching device by punishing
sheriffs and other law enforcement officials who condoned or participated in mob
violence, Chadboum analyzed the failure of the current anti-lynching statutes to operate
effectively, if at all. Noting that improved ouster laws were a necessity if lynching was to
be eradicated, he quoted a finding of Raper’s: ‘“ Do you think I’m going to risk my life
protecting a nigger?”’ was a “representative attitude of peace officers in some o f the 1930
cases.” In the “majority” of these instances, the “mob took possession o f the accused in
the presence of the officer, who did not fire a shot or make any other real effort to protect
the accused.”43
While nine states had made provisions for the removal o f peace officers who
failed to prevent lynchings, Chadboum noted that since the creation o f these statutes in
the early 1900s, not one peace officer had been convicted or ousted because of a
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lynching, owing in part to grand and petit jury inaction, as well as the reluctance of
community members to testify against their sheriff. In addition to these latter two
reasons, however, Chadboum criticized the statutes for ignoring a critical issue. They
stated that the person killed or injured must be in the custody of the officer, but none of
them removed an officer in cases where he did not have custody of a prisoner but was
still negligent. Chadboum argued that this might encourage peace officers to fail to arrest
a person threatened with mob violence so that the ouster penalty could be avoided. To
illustrate this point, and the Southern Commission’s similar argument that in several 1930
cases mob victims were “without benefit of the sheriff,” Chadboum described a few
southern incidents in which the sheriff, “once he found that the accused Negro was
certain of being caught, returned to his office, quite content with the way the things were
being handled. In two other plantation counties—Brazos, Texas, and Sumter, Alabama—
the officers deliberately left matters in the hands o f the local people.”44
If the Southern Commission and its sociologists sought to publicize lynching
statistics and analyze the social origins of extralegal racial violence, the Association of
Southern Women for the Prevention o f Lynching chose a more community-based, activist
approach. On November 1, 1930, a group of twenty-six white women from six southern
states formed the ASWPL. Their goal was to break the tie between the tradition of
chivalry and lynching by using the moral and social influence of a group o f organized
southern white women—the very women that the white patriarchy yearned to protect.
More broadly, it hoped to mobilize white southern anti-lynching opinion. The ASWPL
neither addressed the issue of federal anti-lynching legislation nor problems of
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discrimination and civil rights, choosing to confine its efforts to the direct eradication o f
lynching. That is, since the anti-lynching statutes that already existed were either legally
inadequate or simply ignored by southern juries and lynch mobs, the ASWPL decided to
approach the issue by forgoing the pursuit o f traditionally ineffective “paper laws,” and
instead targeting one of the immediate sources o f the lynching problem. The southern
sheriff, as a “guardian of the law,” was responsible for handling any mob forming in his
county. Aware that sheriffs “were often a complacent part o f mobs,” rarely risking their
lives to protect black prisoners, members of the ASWPL avoided the halls o f Congress
and instead approached their local sheriffs office.45
It required extraordinary commitment for an association member to carry the antilynching message into her sheriffs office. Although some members viewed the southern
sheriff as the “half-drunk” representative of a courthouse gang whose violent means of
law and order repulsed a southern lady’s idea o f friendship, he could just as easily be a
relative or friend 46 But such neighborly relations were what fueled the ASWPL’s
program. Because many sheriffs adhered to the public’s racial opinion, the Association’s
focus on law enforcement was designed to subject sheriffs to powerful demands from
their community that they uphold the law, not the mob. ASWPL members were in a
perfect position to spearhead this plan, for their middle to upper class status guaranteed
that they, their husbands, and relatives could exert pressure on their local sheriffs without
risk of reprisal. The Association reasoned that if a large number o f respectable and
45 Mrs. William J. Neel to the sheriffs of Georgia, January 12, 1933, ASWPL Papers, 5:457, 4:1716. For
a brief discussion of the ASWPL’s involvement with sheriffs’ offices, see Chapter 8 o f Hall, Revolt Against
Chivalry.
46

Jessie Daniel Ames, “Southern Women Look at Lynching,” ASWPL Papers, 4:1837.

37

influential local citizens wanted every possible precaution taken to insure a constitutional
trial for the accused, then most likely the sheriff would reconsider the lessons o f southern
extralegal tradition.47
Of course, the ASWPL knew that it was not just their votes that could affect the
actions of a sheriff but the votes of citizens outside the association. As the “agent o f his
people,” the sheriff would respond to the “emotional demands o f his supporters.” He
would “judge accurately the number o f votes involved” and then work to prevent a
lynching “in accordance with the desires o f the majority.” The office of sheriff was
subject to little interference from state or federal authorities, but local voters held the
power o f the ballot. Therefore, if he received the “moral support” o f his constituents and
realized that the expectations o f his role had changed, then he could “do more to stop
lynching than any other one factor.”48
To begin the campaign, practically every member o f the ASWPL went to her
local sheriff, asking him to sign a pledge stating that he would “use every means” to
“create a public opinion” that would endorse those sheriffs “determined to protect the
Nation from mob violence” and to eradicate lynching, “a crime which should not be
tolerated in any civilized country.” Each member of the ASWPL also urged her fellow
citizens to use the ballot to “see that only those persons who honor the law and hold their
oath o f office inviolate” be permitted to hold the office o f sheriff. Furthermore, the
ASWPL reminded, as voters, citizens could “compel the protection of the community
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against the lawlessness of a lynching” by “demanding” that the sheriff either remove a
prisoner to another county for safekeeping, swear in additional deputies, or request the
protection o f state troops.49
Once ASWPL members received this community backing, they presented sheriffs
with petitions from their local constituents as evidence of the support they would receive
for adhering to their oath of office, and conversely, the opposition they would encounter
if they condoned extralegal measures. In addition to preventing lynching between
outbursts o f violence, the ASWPL also attempted to prevent them when there was a
threat of a mob, or even once one had already formed, by having their husbands, friends,
local ministers, other citizens, and even sometimes the governor, call the sheriff and urge
him to prevent mob action.50
Believing that positive reinforcement would only improve sheriffs’ confidence in
their community’s support, the ASWPL kept extensive “signature records,” published
pamphlets that included names of those sheriffs whose “quick action” deserved ’’special
mention,” and sent a letter to sheriffs who had reduced lynching rates in their counties,
thanking them for their “display of courage, cool judgment, and determination.”
However, for those sheriffs who remained oblivious to persuasion, the ASWPL began a
negative publicity campaign, publishing names o f those who failed to perform their legal
duty and detailing accounts o f their complicity in the death of a black prisoner. A 1937
bulletin asked, “‘Where were the peace officers?’ All eight victims of lynchings in 1937

49 ASWPL Papers, 4:1756; 4:2003; 5:15; Jessie Daniel Ames, “Southern Women and Lynching,”
ASWPL Papers, 4:1791.
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were in the hands of peace officers. In seven o f the lynchings, investigations indicate,
officers were either in the mob or were in collusion with the mob.” Each story revealed
how easily the mobs could have been thwarted and how quickly the sheriffs surrendered
to the angry crowd. In several cases, the sheriffs claimed to have been “overpowered.”
Some denied that a lynching had even occurred: ’’There wasn’t any lynching. There were
just six or eight men going about their business.” Others openly admitted their refusal to
defy their white constituency: “I do not call the citizens who executed the Negroes a mob.
I consider their action an expression of the will of the people.” Through investigations of
lynchings and prevented lynchings, the ASWPL had argued from the onset o f their
campaign that sheriffs could safeguard prisoners if they wished. As Ames had surmised,
the common claim of being “overpowered,” for example, was based on political
expediency, not fear o f bodily harm.51
By 1941, 1,355 peace officers had signed the ASWPL pledges, and the
organization could report that in one year alone, forty peace officers, many o f whom had
signed ASWPL pledges, had protected their prisoners from mob violence. In 1968,
sociologist John Shelton Reed conducted an “evaluation” o f the ASWPL, concluding that
it was particularly effective in preventing lynchings in which mobs took prisoners from
the custody of law officers, for in counties where the association had made its presence
strongly felt, a dramatic decrease in such crimes had occurred.52 While Ames would not
have claimed that these improved numbers were due to the ASWPL’s efforts alone,
51 ASWPL Papers, 4:55; 4:1749; 4:1881; 4:1995; 5:457; “Lynching is Wholesale Murder,” ASWPL
Papers, 4:1861.
52 John Shelton Reed, “An Evaluation of an Anti-Lynching Organization,” Social Problems 16 (Fall
1968): 172-82.

40

Reed’s study proved that the ASWPL program was indeed able to affect the actions of
sheriffs and create a climate of disapproval that deterred potential lynchers.
The ASWPL’s ability to achieve success in their anti-lynching campaign
illustrates that the white South was not a monolithic wall of resistance, but rather
represented a spectrum of opinions regarding race relations in the South. As Martin
Luther King would argue twenty years after the ASWPL’s campaign, there were three
kinds of white people in the South: extreme segregationists, moderates, and a tiny
minority of vocal anti-segregationists. The ASWPL reached the moderates—those whites
who quietly disapproved of, or were at least embarrassed by, the behavior of the violent
mobs and sheriffs.
Certainly, these “middle-roaders” were not outspoken in their opposition to
extralegal racial violence like Will Alexander or Jessie Daniel Ames. Indeed, few white
southerners were. But, when handed an anti-lynching petition, for example, moderates
could offer their support without ever having to approach a neighbor’s door or a sheriffs
office. As historian David Chappell argues, those who represented the middle of the
spectrum—neither the segregationists nor the activists—did not “stuck their necks out,”
but instead quietly acted in order to restore social peace, a good business climate, or their
town’s reputation.53
Ida B. Wells, the CIC, and the Southern Commission gave voice to the problem of
southern racial violence, and the ASWPL further expanded the anti-lynching campaign
by reaching into their communities and giving voice to an otherwise silent group of

53 David Chappell, Inside Agitators: White Southerners in the Civil Rights Movement (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1994), xv-xxiv.
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dissenters. However, while organizations like the ASWPL and sociologists like Arthur
Raper had begun to raise the white public’s awareness of southern racial violence and
southern sheriffs acquiescence in it, the Civil Rights Movement demonstrated that
awareness did not necessarily prompt change. As discussed in the next chapter, the battle
for voting rights in two small Deep South towns required the intervention o f the federal
government to erase the color line that the sheriffs had so carefully drawn.
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PART III
SHERIFF LAWRENCE RAINEY AND SHERIFF JIM CLARK: THE BATTLE FOR
VOTING RIGHTS IN MISSISSIPPI AND ALABAMA

“It is more than a coincidence that the only prisoners who are consistently coming out of
jail with bruises and black eyes are civil rights activists. This isn’t law. It is sadism hiding
behind a badge.”
Southern Regional Council, 1964

“Deep South sheriffs are usually big men, often running to fat. This one weighs over 240
pounds and is developing a paunch.”
New York Times ’ description of Sheriff Lawrence Rainey, 1964

“With great clarity Bird saw the dark ring of sweat around the band of the sheriffs
Stetson, the white-knuckled grip o f his hands about the billy club. The sheriff flicked
away a drop o f sweat that ran down his temple; a pulse throbbed in the protruding vein of
his forehead.”
Go, Go, Said the Bird, Fictional account of Selma by Anne Nell Stallworth, 1984

One night in July 1962, Claude Sitton, a New York Times reporter who often
covered the Civil Rights Movement in the South, visited a small black church in Terrell
County, Georgia, where local residents and SNCC workers had gathered for a voting
rights meeting. Sitton’s past experience suggested that the meeting would not proceed
without interruption from local law enforcement. His intuition proved correct. Sheriff
Zeke Mathews entered the church and commandeered the pulpit, announcing that “quite
enough” of Terrell’s black residents— 51 out of 8,209—were already registered to vote.
As one of Mathews’ deputies fingered his revolver and another slapped a five-cell
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flashlight in the palm o f his hand, Mathews blatantly acknowledged his refusal to
recognize the goals of the Movement, declaring, “We want our colored people to go on
living like they have for the last hundred years.” Sitton later left the church to find his car
tire slashed and sand in the gas tank. His vivid, front-page account outraged readers,
including President John F. Kennedy and his attorney general and brother, Robert. In less
than two weeks after Sitton’s story appeared in the Times, Justice Department lawyers
and FBI agents descended on Terrell County and filed a voting rights complaint against
Sheriff Mathews.54
Stories like Sitton’s were valuable in educating the country and federal
government officials on the challenges that civil rights workers and blacks faced in the
South. By 1960, lynching had disappeared almost entirely from the southern landscape,
but the southern values and attitudes that had given rise to it had not. By playing a central
role in thwarting African Americans' attempts at desegregation and acquisition of the
ballot, some southern sheriffs continued to impose the racial caste system. For example,
in February 1963, Ruby Hurley, the NAACP's Southeast Regional Secretary, wrote a
letter to Michigan Congressman John Dingell, Jr. (D) that surveyed black southerners’
continuing problems with segregated transportation. She reported that in Inverness,
Florida, both Greyhound and Trail ways used a Standard Oil gas station as their bus
station. Near the passenger boarding area, signs approximately two feet high were boldly
lettered "White Only" and "cannot be missed by anyone.” Hurley learned that the sheriff
“makes himself conspicuous on schedule with the buses," for he knew that his mere
54 Taylor Branch, Parting the Waters: America in the King Years, 1954-1963 (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1988), 619-20.

44

presence would keep blacks from boarding.55 As they had done for over a century,
southern sheriffs continued to defend the racist views of their white constituency and to
deny the black community protection and equality.
As the findings of two sociologists who conducted a 1967 study o f the southern
sheriffs office show, in some communities, expectations of the sheriff had not changed,
either. Dana Brammer and James Hurley observed that although state constitutions and
statutes served as the primary determinant o f the office's responsibilities, "to a great
extent" sheriffs responded not just to the statutes but to custom and environmental
conditions. That is, the ability o f the sheriff to handle the pressures and complaints
brought by his local citizenry still played a large part in determining his success or failure
in office. Brammer and Hurley's conclusions barely differed from those of earlier
sociologists like Arthur Raper because the nature of the citizens’ complaints had not
changed. Race-related issues remained in the forefront of the southern mind, and the fear
o f black equality persisted. The Civil Rights Movement only heightened this fear,
especially in the rural, small-town South.56
The conclusions o f the federal government and the Southern Regional Council
(SRC) echoed those o f Brammer and Hurley and the NAACP. The SRC observed that the
cooperation of law enforcement authorities in civil rights violence was due to the
“climate of opinion” which tolerated and encouraged the “brute.” Likewise, the
Commission on Civil Rights knew that the most "crucial factor" in maintaining law and
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order in a community gripped by racial crisis was the support o f state and local law
enforcement officers. However, in a region often frustrated and angered by black pursuit
o f equality, "support’' was color-biased. In its 1965 Law Enforcement Report, the
Commission concluded that local law enforcement "failed to protect Negroes and civil
rights workers from violence, interfered with the exercise of Federal rights . .. and
abused their discretion in the administration of justice." Furthermore, they found
extensive evidence o f Klan connections with local sheriffs and deputies.57
Nowhere was this more evident than in Neshoba County, Mississippi, and Dallas
County, Alabama. During the mid-1960s, these two Deep South states became the targets
o f the civil rights movement's growing emphasis on the registration of black voters.
Unlike the sheriff mentioned in Ruby Hurley's letter, the sheriffs governing these
counties made it past the archives o f the NAACP and onto national newspaper headlines.
When three civil rights workers—Michael Schwemer, Andrew Goodman, and James
Chaney—were murdered in the Neshoba County seat o f Philadelphia in the summer of
1964, the subsequent FBI investigation revealed that Sheriff Lawrence Rainey's office
was linked to several other incidents o f racial violence. In the neighboring state to the
east, demonstrators in Selma suffered under the club-wielding hand o f Sheriff Jim Clark,
who was determined to deny the ballot to the black community. Clark and Rainey's
similar physical descriptions became recognized throughout America. Journalists often
introduced the sheriffs into news stories by noting their weight, and adjectives like

57 “Law Enforcement in Mississippi” (Atlanta: Southern Regional Council, 1964): 19; Michael Belknap,
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"burly,” "beefy," and "bear-shaped" frequently preceded their names, as though their
f o

large size could help explain the racist actions they supported and inflicted.
Undoubtedly, too, such descriptions made them seem especially threatening to readers,
heightening the nation’s concern regarding race relations in the South.
When national attention focused on these small southern towns, outsiders
shuddered at the racism evident in some o f the South's law enforcement officials. The
majority of white citizens in Philadelphia and Selma, however, attempted to defend their
southern way o f life and their sheriffs. They found themselves in an unwelcome spotlight,
and their reaction to it illustrates that the passage of decades had not changed white racial
attitudes, the prominent status of the sheriffs office, or the support and protection that
this powerful elected official received from his community and other local officials,
especially in the Deep South. Furthermore, both Rainey and Clark appeared confident
that their position protected them against punishment from the federal government. Like
Sheriff Shipp in his jail cell over fifty years earlier, Rainey displayed casual ease and
confidence throughout the months o f indictments and arrests, while Clark simply refused
to keep his billy club idle, responding to every court order with another display of
violence. Clark and Rainey knew that no white man in the state, especially the man in
charge o f "keeping Negroes in their place" would ever be punished for mistreating
blacks, even if in Rainey's case, that mistreatment included condoning murder.
Noting the deaths of the three civil rights workers who were murdered in
Mississippi and three victims of opposition to voting rights activity in Selma, the NAACP

58 Gay Talese, “Burly Sheriff Clark,” New York Times, 16 March 1965, p. 32; Newsweek, 25 Jan. 1965,
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succinctly and pointedly wrote: "These events demonstrate that some white southerners
have a license to murder, a license too frequently issued to them by southern police
officers who refuse to vigorously investigate and apprehend, by southern public
prosecutors who sabotage their cases, by southern judges who are openly biased, and by
southern juries who refuse to convict."59 The NAACP was undoubtedly referencing, too,
that the judicial process in the South was often marked by efficiency rather than fairness.
That is, especially in black capital cases, the threat o f white violence provided little
opportunity for adequate pre-trial preparation, even with the most conscientious of
counsel, and put juries under tremendous pressure to deliberate quickly, if at all.60 The
NAACP’s words also capture the vulnerability of civil rights workers in the South, and
the domino effect that occurred when civil rights cases arose. Most importantly, however,
the quote illustrates the southern sheriffs central role in the chain of events. He was the
first to topple the dominoes -- the first to issue license for racial violence and inequality.

59 “An Open Letter to President Johnson,” NAACP Papers, Part 24, 17:649. The letter was not signed by
any particular member of the NAACP.
60 Neil McMillen, Dark Journey: Black Mississippians in the Age o f Jim Crow (Urbana: University of
Illinois Press, 1989). See Chapter, “Jim Crow’s Courts.”
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As Sheriff Lawrence Rainey often said, “It’s always better to stop something
before it happens instead of waiting till after it happens.”61 For Rainey, that “something”
was the steady arrival of civil rights workers in Philadelphia, Mississippi. After the
disappearance of Schwerner, Chaney, and Goodman, the nation soon discovered that
Rainey was a man of his word. He believed that his sheriffs uniform had “a lot to do
with” the work required by the office, and certainly, his appearance suggested that he
took his job seriously. At six feet two inches and 240 pounds, Rainey was a formidable
figure. The belt line o f his khaki uniform bulged with polished leather, burnished brass
and lead ammunition, and a heavy holstered gun. Easily recognizable with his calf-length
boots, a cattleman's hat turned up on the sides atop a balding head, and a fist-sized chaw
of tobacco in his jaw, he roamed about town in his big gray Oldsmobile equipped with
the trappings of his office—a siren, red light, loudspeaker, armament, gilt-lettered doors,
and extra cartons o f Red Man.
In August o f 1963, when Rainey ran for sheriff, Congress was working on passing a
national civil rights bill. In an advertisement in the Neshoba (MI) Democrat, Rainey
wrote, "I believe in our Southern way of life and will strive to keep it that way." Another
advertisement blared these words in large print: "Vote for Lawrence Rainey, the Man
who can cope with situations that may arise." Rainey appeared at meetings all over the
county, and with one hand on his hip holster and the other rolling his wide-brimmed hat,
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he would say, "If you elect me, I'll take care o f things for you." Locals knew to which
"situations" and "things" he was referring, for Mississippi’s race problem was an
overwhelming concern, and Rainey's record as a police patrolman and a deputy sheriff in
Philadelphia was, in the eyes of his white public, impressive. He had killed two blacks,
and the African American community openly feared him. Furthermore, Rainey had been
bom and raised on a farm in adjoining Kemper County by "law-abiding" parents who
taught him to "obey the laws o f the land." For white Philadelphians, Rainey’s record and
his southern heritage made him the perfect candidate. Confident that he would control the
black population, an absolute requirement for a Mississippi law enforcement official,
Rainey’s white constituents elected him by a handsome majority.

/TO

With the slogan “Crack Mississippi and you can crack the South,” civil rights
workers in 1962 made Mississippi the primary target o f the Movement's growing
emphasis on the registration of black voters. In order to unify the efforts o f all civil rights
groups working in Mississippi, members of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), the
Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), the Student Nonviolent Coordinating
Committee (SNCC), and the NAACP created the Council o f Federated Organizations
(COFO) in 1963. During the “Freedom Summer” of 1964, COFO mobilized hundreds of
young volunteers, including nearly nine hundred white college students from outside the
state, to establish "freedom schools," organize black community centers, and press for
voter registrations that would give the state's four hundred thousand voting-age blacks
greater political leverage. But if COFO was determined to break Mississippi's traditional
63 Ads quoted in Cleghom, 68-9; William Bradford Huie, “The Untold Story of the Mississippi
Murders,” Saturday Evening Post 237 (Sept. 5, 1964); David Nevin, “A Strange, Tight Little Town, Loath
to Admit Complicity,” Life 57 (Dec. 18, 1964): 38-9.
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racial customs, a revived Ku Klux Klan and thousands of other Mississippians were
determined to fight these “young busybodies” who were challenging white supremacy.
As a report from the Southern Regional Council noted, the Freedom Summer project
“aroused fears comparable to the ancient terror of a slave uprising.” Therefore, many in
the white community echoed the sentiment of an editorial in the Neshoba Democrat.
“Outsiders who come in here and try to stir up trouble should be dealt with in a manner
they won’t forget.” They adhered to the philosophy that “when the Negro is subdued,
there is peace” and looked to their local law enforcement officers to keep the black
population “restrained.”64
In April 1964, two months before the COFO workers arrived, the KKK planted
a burning cross in the courthouse square, the geographical center o f Philadelphia. No
local citizens quenched the flames or tore it down, and no law enforcement officer would
admit to having seen the cross placed in the square. Local newspapers noted that Sheriff
Rainey was investigating, but nothing came o f the investigation. Inside the courthouse, a
poster, noting twenty reasons why one should "join, aid and support" the Klan of
Mississippi, was tacked to the bulletin board in the lobby, not far from Rainey's office.
The poster remained there for several days.65
As the Klan gathered and talked of destroying the northern outsiders, the
"communist-led invaders" who wanted to place too much social, political, and economic
power into the hands o f the black population, the leaders o f the Mississippi Summer
64 “Crack MI”: Richard Woodley, “A Recollection of Michael Schwemer,” The Reporter (July 16,
1964): 24. Dallas Morning News, 21 June 1964, p. 2; “Law Enforcement in Mississippi” (Southern
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Project informed their audience o f civil rights volunteers that death was a possibility, and
expectations o f constitutional rights an impossibility. SNCC leader Robert Moses told
them, "Everything the white power structure does in Mississippi is unconstitutional." At
the head of the white power structure was Sheriff Rainey, and as one magazine editorial
commented, in the land of Mississippi, the sheriff interpreted the Constitution to favor the
racial status quo, not paper laws, and amended the Bill o f Rights at will.66
Furthermore, Moses could have added, expectations of protection from the federal
government were also unrealistic. Recent history had demonstrated as much. In 1959,
Rainey, then a city policeman, shot an innocent black man. When a coroner’s jury ruled
that the killing was justifiable homicide, Medgar Evers, then Mississippi Field Secretary
for the NAACP, asked the U.S. Attorney General, William Rogers, to investigate further.
Although Rogers promised Evers that the matter would receive “careful consideration,”
within less than a month the Justice Department concluded that no “violation o f any
federal statute” had occurred and that there was no “basis for any action by this
department.”67 Whether aware of this particular story or not, parents and relatives of
Freedom Summer participants wrote President Johnson, noting the “breakdown” of
Mississippi state protection and urging him to send federal police forces to prevent “any
tragic occurrence” in a region known as the “toughest” in its handling of race relations.
Echoing their concerns, Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall reported to Attorney
General Robert Kennedy that “law enforcement officials in Mississippi are widely
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believed to be linked to anti-Negro activity, or at the very least to tolerate it.” Roy
Wilkins, Executive Secretary of the NAACP, also informed the Attorney General that
only the employment of federal troops could guarantee a measure of protection for both
the rights workers and the black population.68
Yet despite these warnings and requests, Kennedy, like his predecessor, deemed
federal intervention a violation of the federal-state relationship. That is, he believed that it
was Mississippi’s responsibility to protect its citizens, and vigorous local law
enforcement should have been able to cope with any foreseeable problems caused by the
Freedom Summer. However, because Rainey had chosen to cope with the “problems”
through repression rather than protection, the idea that local law enforcement was
equipped to handle the influx of rights workers was only theoretically accurate. As the
Atlanta Constitution editorialized after the discovery of the bodies o f Goodman, Cheney,
and Schwemer, while federal administration o f a state was generally an “absurd” idea, in
areas like Neshoba County where local law enforcement officers participated in, or at
least ignored, the murder of three civil rights workers, federal intervention was not only
desirable, but necessary.69
In June 1964, summer volunteer Andrew Goodman joined CORE staffers Chaney
and Schwemer, who had been working in the state for several months, in their voter
registration efforts. After spending the afternoon visiting the site o f a local black church
that had burned to the ground and passing out leaflets urging members o f a nearby black
church to attend voter registration schools, the three workers were pulled over by Deputy
68
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Sheriff Cecil Price. He took them to the Philadelphia jail, charging Chaney with speeding
and holding the other two on suspicion o f arson. That evening, Price released the three,
and they headed out o f Philadelphia toward Meridian, their home base for the summer.
As newspapers across the nation reported less than forty-eight hours later, the young men
never made it to their destination. In the long investigation that ensued, the FBI would
discover that a mob composed o f Klan members and other local citizens brutally attacked
and murdered the three, and that the sheriffs office played a concealed but pivotal role in
the crime.
Price became the central figure in the investigation, for he had alerted the mob
that the men had left the jail. At the time o f the lynching, Sheriff Rainey had been visiting
his wife in the hospital. However, while he had not witnessed or participated in the
murder, Rainey was likely aware of at least one of the three rights workers' impending
death. The Klan had begun planning Schwemer’s “elimination” within two months of his
arrival in Mississippi in January 1964, and Klan members had not only elected Rainey to
office, they were his friends. He had made it clear during his campaign that racial issues
would be his main priority; thus he would acquiesce to racial violence, especially when a
civil rights-backed "summer project" demanded a fierce reminder o f white power. The
FBI named Rainey a conspirator in the crime, a quiet accomplice who fulfilled his
promise of racial control.
A week after the workers' disappearance, President Johnson sent the FBI into the
piney woods and pastures of Neshoba County. One local resident approached an agent,
and when no one else was near, whispered, "I think if I were in your place, I'd start with
the sheriffs office." The FBI quickly discovered, however, that such a tip was a rarity,
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and that silence was the more typical reaction of local citizens. As one journalist
observed, "to speak out against the Klan or even to question Lawrence Rainey's treatment
o f Negroes has come to be equated somehow with disloyalty to one's own." That is,
conformity to the racial status quo and uniformity o f attitude were part of the southern
way o f life, most notably in rural areas like Neshoba County. A field report from the
Southern Regional Council supported this journalist's observation, noting that "in
Mississippi, 'law enforcement' means control of Negroes. Protection o f Negroes and
restraint of their white attackers is not included in the concept. . . The anti-Negro ruffian
is protected by the concealment o f woods and swamps, by the sympathy of many of his
neighbors, and by a paralysis o f law enforcement." FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover echoed
the SRC’s words, noting that “around Philadelphia, law enforcement is practically nil and
many time sheriffs and deputies participate in the crime.”
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The "anti-Negro ruffian" also received the sympathy and support of local
government officials. Governor Paul Johnson said he was "satisfied" that everything was
being done to locate the missing workers, even though the national government, not
Mississippi, was conducting the search. Johnson denied that such a disappearance was
unique to Mississippi, or a reflection o f the state's racist climate. He told newsmen that
the disappearance was something that "could happen anytime" in any part of the country,
adding that "it happens in New York every night." He boasted that Mississippi had the
lowest crime rate in the nation, but failed to mention that when whites committed crimes
against blacks, they were rarely arrested, brought to trial, or convicted. The civil rights
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movement spawned much anti-black violence—nineteen church burnings, fifty beatings
o f blacks by whites, eleven black deaths that were almost certainly lynchings—but these
•

crimes did not even make it onto a police blotter.
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The journalists, cameramen, and FBI agents who descended upon
Philadelphia in the days after the disappearance encountered the wrath of Rainey’s loyal
followers, who denied that a lynching had occurred. When eight northern reporters tried
to question Rainey about the missing men, an angry crowd chased them from the
courthouse. Philadelphia citizens stoutly defended the idea that the civil rights workers
were not missing, but had purposely staged their own disappearance in an effort to bring
bad publicity to Mississippi. As the Delta Democrat-Times editorialized, "the general
feeling among people is that they are not concerned whether the men are ever found. A
feeling of'let it be a lesson' is evident." Rainey echoed their opinion, telling reporters that
the workers were just "hiding and trying to cause a lot of bad publicity” for the state. He
told the FBI that the sheriffs office did not have any knowledge of the Klan's existence in
Neshoba County, and though he boasted during his campaign that he had killed two black
men in his custody, he informed the FBI that he had never mistreated a prisoner. In
addition, despite the fact that the Klan had distributed pictures o f Schwemer months
before his arrival in the county, Rainey said that he did not recognize any of the faces of
the missing men.72
Over a month after the workers’ disappearance, a Klan member secretly revealed
to the FBI that he knew where Chaney, Goodman, and Schwemer were buried. Once the

71
72

Meridian Star, 26 June 1964, p. 1.
Delta Democrat-Times, 29 June 1964, p. 4; Time 84 (July 3, 1964): 4.

56

bodies were unearthed, Rainey refused to speak to the FBI unless they had a warrant.
According to New York Times reporter Reese Cleghom, the news did not surprise the
black community, but the majority o f white Philadelphians did not believe, or at least
refused to publicly acknowledge, that the men had been murdered. After speaking with
both black and white residents of Neshoba County, Cleghom observed that Sheriff
Rainey had "two faces." In the eyes o f the white community, he was a "likable fellow," "a
fine man," and the "most cooperative" of any county sheriff. Some o f Philadelphia's most
prominent citizens testified to the national press about Rainey's sterling and generous
character. Jack Tannehill, editor of the Neshoba Democrat, noted that when Rainey saw
"a drunk nigger on the street, instead o f just grabbing him, Lawrence will say, 'Now boy,
you get on home now 'fore I have to run you in.' That's the kind o f man Lawrence Rainey
is." A Philadelphia banker related another incident illustrating what he viewed as
Rainey's compassion: "This nigger woman was trying to cash a forged check. I told the
teller to call for the sheriff. The nigger woman snatched the check and started to run. The
sheriff caught up with her at the comer. She resisted and was slamming him up against a
building when I arrived. I don't believe in police brutality, but I told the sheriff, "Take
that club and knock the hell out of her.' He didn't do it."73
Just as Rainey and his fellow Philadelphians agreed that the three civil rights
workers had faked their disappearance, the citizens’ comments again demonstrate the
nature o f race relations in this small Mississippi town and the common bond that existed
between a sheriff and his white community. In terms of their sheriffs character, whites
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saw only what they wanted to see, and blacks saw the worst. For the black community,
Rainey’s face inspired fear and hatred, not respect and praise. As white mouths closed in
shock, refusing to believe that such a violent crime had occurred, the recovery of the
bodies prompted the formerly silent black community to speak about the brutality o f the
sheriffs office in Neshoba County. One black man, Wilmer Jones, noted that Rainey
arrested him on suspicion of asking a white female store clerk for a date. Rainey and
Price repeatedly slapped him in his cell and cut off his goatee with a pocketknife. They
released him several hours later to four Klansmen who were waiting outside the jail to
administer further punishment for his “crime.” Other members o f the black community
came forward to describe beatings with the sheriffs blackjack or in one case, a belt from
a cotton gin machine.74
These stories formed a sordid pattern o f law enforcement’s mistreatment of the
black community and revealed the fear and repression that the black community endured.
For example, Rainey's mere presence could inspire terror. When the sheriffs car patrolled
the black neighborhoods at night, some would leave their porches and go quietly inside
their houses for fear that a glance of the eyes or a shift of the feet could spark the sheriffs
anger. One night Rainey arrived at the County Fair and stood wide-legged under a light,
silently and sternly surveying this gathering of over 300 people. Gradually the crowd
began to disperse until the grounds were empty. Rainey, like some other southern
sheriffs, took advantage o f the power and prestige attributed to his office, and blacks, the
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usual victims o f such power, knew that they were helpless against the sheriff and the
white community that protected him.
In Mississippi, and throughout the South, blacks believed that the color of their
skin typically guaranteed guilt, and attempts to prove otherwise were futile. One man told
agents that Rainey searched him for a gun, and when he denied possessing one, Rainey
asked, "Nigger, do you know who's running this county? Lawrence A. Rainey is running
this county." The young man interjected, "I thought the mayor . ..," and Rainey replied,
"Nigger don't come talking about no mayor cause I'm sheriff in this county." Another
man, whose story was repeated in the national press, told agents that he was deathly
afraid of Rainey after sustaining a cerebral concussion due to Rainey's repeated blows
upon his head. As he phrased it, "Rainey would say I was drunk and I would have to say,
'Yessir, I'm drunk," and he could beat me up again and nothing would be done about it. It
would be a nigger's word against a white sheriff, and what he says goes."

nc

Even the FBI's word against a sheriff seemed incapable o f weakening the sheriffs
power and prestige. In the months that followed the discovery o f the bodies, the FBI first
charged the Philadelphia sheriffs office with conspiring to and actually depriving six
black Philadelphians o f their constitutional rights while acting under the color o f law and
twice filed charges related to the murder o f the three civil rights workers. Each time,
Rainey and Price not only received the support of the white community, but that of
southern officials. In late September 1964, a Mississippi grand jury convened to
determine if the stories of brutality about which local blacks spoke were true. In his
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charge to the jury, Circuit Judge O.H. Barnett, an outspoken segregationist, noted that
Nesboba County had been "indicted and tried" before the world by "Socialistic-minded
liberals" who would not wait for the courts^o act. Furthermore, he told the jurors, the
investigation would have the assistance o f "the most courageous sheriff in all America,
Lawrence Rainey." With these words of an elected Mississippi official ringing in their
ears, the jury did not bring indictments against Rainey or Price.
However, the FBI moved for federal indictments, and a federal grand jury
convened. Despite a small card tied to Price's lapel that read, "Regardless of what you see
or hear about me, I'M INNOCENT," the grand jury found the sheriffs office guilty.
When the FBI arrested Rainey and Price and brought them to the Federal Building in
downtown Meridian, forty miles west o f Philadelphia, they met a cheering crowd of over
two hundred whites. Other members of the crowd jeered at reporters and shoved
photographers aside while Rainey and Price, smiling broadly, walked into the building.
U.S. Commissioner Esther Carter released them on bond. As the sheriff and his deputy
exited the building, a local bystander muttered, "All that fuss over a few niggers."
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During October and November, the FBI continued its investigations of the
Philadelphia sheriffs office and its involvement with the murders o f the three civil rights
workers. The federal presence in the small eastern Mississippi town angered many o f the
local residents, and the arrest o f Rainey, Price, and nineteen Philadelphia citizens further
prompted the white community's staunch defense of their sheriff and their vision of
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appropriate law enforcement. Because murder is a state offense, thus rendering the
Mississippians beyond the jurisdictional reach of the federal government, the complaints
filed by the FBI charged these men under an 1870 law that, appropriately enough, had
been passed to control Klan terrorism. The FBI advised Governor Paul Johnson of the
nature of its evidence in the hope that the state would institute a prosecution o f the case
on murder charges, but the governor and other state officials declined to do so. Jackson
FBI Chief Roy Moore found Johnson “skittish” about the FBI’s suggestion, which Moore
attributed to Johnson’s fear of political suicide in bringing a murder charge against the
popular Sheriff Rainey. Considering that Governor Johnson, in an address to a crowd at
the Neshoba County Fair in August, shouted that "neither Mississippians nor their state
and county officers have any obligation to enforce the federal civil rights law," the state's
refusal to charge local citizens or the sheriffs office with murdering three civil rights
workers is unsurprising.78
Thus, on December 4, FBI agents arrived at the Neshoba County courthouse to
arrest Rainey and Price for assisting in what they believed to be a Klan-organized
conspiracy to "injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate" Schwemer, Chaney, and
Goodman. As the agents waited for the officers to return from a "whisky raid" in a nearby
town, an angry crowd joined them on the courthouse steps. The New York Times reported
that Rainey paid no attention to the federal agents when he arrived and "strode" into the
courthouse with a revolver "jouncing on one big hip and a blackjack dangling from the
other." The crowd shouted insults at the agents as they left with Rainey and Price, and in
78 William Bradford Huie, Three Lives fo r Mississippi (New York: WCC Books, 1965): 239; Philip
Dray, We Are Not Afraid: The Story o f Goodman, Schwemer, and Chaney and the Civil Rights Campaign
for Mississippi (New York: MacMillan, 1998): 435.
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an attempt to prevent their town and their sheriff from receiving unwanted national
publicity, several men grabbed the arms and cameras o f photographers. A local resident
chased a CBS cameraman from the courthouse square, and an Associated Press
photographer noted that one of the men threatened him with a knife.79
An employee of a local bank, watching from his doorway, told the Times reporter
that the arrests only proved that "the whole country is taking orders from Martin Luther
King." Although Philadelphia's white moderate majority expressed relief that the federal
government had finally ended the suspense over the suspects' identity, and some
organized a letter-writing campaign to urge Governor Johnson to see that the defendants
would be fully prosecuted, most residents believed that the FBI simply wanted an easy
solution to the crime and was looking for a "whipping boy" when it arrested the sheriff,
his deputy, and several local citizens. As David Nevin, a Life reporter, observed,
Philadelphia, Mississippi, was a "strange, tight little town, loath to admit complicity," and
content in its conviction that northerners, outside agitators, provoked the deaths of the
three civil rights workers. They believed themselves faultless, and as a result, Nevin
noted, they were "quite unable to feel any collective guilt." Instead, they felt pride in the
actions o f their sheriff and his deputy. The day after his arrest, Price said, "It took me an
OA

hour to get to work this morning. I had to spend so much time shaking hands."
Obviously, the arrest had not stained the reputation o f the sheriffs office, but enhanced it.
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But if most Neshobans heralded Rainey as a southern folk hero, a lawman who
ran his county in the traditional fashion, the national press not only expressed shock at the
nature of southern justice, but mocked the physical characteristics of this man who
seemed to personify racism. After his arraignment on December 4, Life magazine ran a
double-page spread o f Rainey with a large chew of tobacco in his cheek and a bag of Red
Man prominently displayed in his lap. He casually rested his bulky weight on his elbows
and grinned broadly at his co-defendants seated beside him. The Times voiced surprise
that the "255-pound sheriff showed no sign o f being shaken" and after being released on
bond until a trial date could be determined, returned to his law enforcement duties by that
afternoon.81 Again, the journalist mentioned Rainey’s weight, as though his large size
helped explain his stalwart reaction to his arrest. In truth, however, Rainey's confidence
and unrepentance, like that o f the other defendants, grew out o f an awareness of local
white sentiment. In a land where even the governor openly refused to support the goals of
the civil rights movement, conviction of the sheriff for conspiring to subvert these goals,
even in such a violent fashion, seemed doubtful.
The black community was aware o f local white sentiment as well. A group of
white lawyers and businessmen organized a statewide defense fund to pay the legal
expenses of the twenty-one men, which soon surpassed the fund for rebuilding the burned
Mt. Zion church. And while a meeting of the State Sheriffs Association heralded Rainey
as a hero, applauding him "to the rafters," the black community expressed fear that the
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sheriff would be acquitted. Although happy to see Rainey and Price arrested, as one
woman told a Times reporter, black citizens still feared what would "happen if they let
the sheriff off."82 They knew that conviction o f a white man, much less a sheriff, on civil
rights charges would be unlikely and held little hope that the Rainey and Price would be
removed from office.
Martin Luther King, however, hailed the news and praised the FBI “for the work
they have done in uncovering the perpetrators of this dastardly act.” James Farmer, the
national director of CORE, echoed King’s approval, but cautioned, “The prosecution
must now be diligent and vigorous. We want the defendants to have a trial that is fair in
every regard - the guilty must be convicted for the sake o f justice, not vengeance.” The
sense o f accomplishment, however, proved fleeting. On December 10 the defendants
gathered in the Meridian courtroom for their preliminary hearing to establish whether
sufficient evidence existed to hold the accused group for trial. The hearing began with the
FBI testifying that it had a signed confession from one o f the accused who had witnessed
the killing of the three rights workers. To the surprise o f government attorneys, U.S.
Commissioner for the Southern District o f Mississippi Esther Carter refused to allow the
introduction of the confession, declaring it hearsay evidence because only one FBI agent
had been present during the interrogation, and dismissed the charges against the men.
Justice Department attorney Robert Owen argued that a sworn, signed statement
introduced into a preliminary hearing by a federal agent had never before been
disallowed, but Carter held firm.

82 Huie, “Three Lives,” 200; John Herbers, “Negroes Anxious on Rights Trial,” New York Times, 9 Dec.
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A native Mississippian, she seemed to be determined that Rainey and Price would
not be punished for fulfilling the expectations of the majority o f their white constituents,
and likewise, that the other nineteen men would not be punished for upholding the goals
o f white supremacy. As the New York Times noted, the “dismissal of the Government’s
civil rights prosecutions in Mississippi demonstrates again the difficulty of enforcing
Federal criminal law in the Deep South when racial feelings are involved . . . Miss Carter
is an illustration of the localism inherent even in the federal judicial system,” for she was
appointed by a regionally and racially biased federal judge in Mississippi, not the more
neutral Justice Department. When news of the defendants’ release reached those waiting
outside the courthouse, a black woman fell to the pavement screaming, "Jesus, Jesus,
no!" But when Rainey left the building, white spectators shook his hand and slapped him
on the back, and a local policeman said, "OP Rainey could be elected governor now."
The Justice Department repeated Owen’s argument in the courtroom, calling
Carter's refusal to accept a law officer's report o f a signed confession "totally without
precedent" and immediately called on federal Judge William Harold Cox o f the Southern
District of Mississippi to reconvene the federal grand jury. The national press expressed
doubt that the Justice Department’s determined pursuit of conviction could ever be
realized, even with a federal jury, for as the New York Times editorialized, “juries in the
South, whether Federal or state, generally are reluctant to convict whites in civil rights
cases.” The Delta Democrat-Times agreed but provided a more vivid description o f
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13 Dec. 1964.

65

southern jurors and the southern legal system: “The burden upon the grand jurors is not a
light one. Too many of their fellow white Mississippians will regard them as traitors to
‘our way o f life’ (which in this case means murder) if they return any indictments.”
However, on January 15, 1965, a federal grand jury in Jackson charged the group with
conspiracy to deprive Schwemer, Goodman, and Chaney o f their federally secured rights
and conspiracy to deprive the three of their constitutional rights while "acting under the
color of law."84
Again, Rainey reacted nonchalantly to his impending arrest. Newsweek noted that
he and the rest of the suspects seemed "neither surprised nor visibly concerned at their
fate before a Mississippi jury." While waiting for Commissioner Carter to issue their
bonds, Rainey and Price chatted and joked with the crowd that had gathered in the federal
building. As they had done before, he and Price returned to their law enforcement duties,
and again, the New York Times expressed shock that neither took a leave o f absence: "It
would seem elementary that, until the charges have been passed upon, the indicted sheriff
and his chief deputy would be suspended. In New York, for example, it would be
unthinkable for a patrolman even more a ranking police official to stay at his post while
*

under criminal charges. But that does not seem the way things are done in Neshoba
County." Instead, Rainey and Price never removed their badges and quickly returned to
the streets o f Philadelphia as the "principal upholders of peace, order, and justice."85
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A month later, Price and Rainey again benefited from the prejudice o f a court
official. Judge Cox dismissed the indictment charging the defendants with conspiring to
deprive the three rights workers of their federally secured rights on the grounds that the
federal government had no jurisdiction. He ruled that Price and Rainey would only be
tried on a misdemeanor count, which carried a maximum penalty o f a one year
imprisonment and a five thousand dollar fine. Cox was known as a segregationist
unsympathetic to civil rights cases. He had called black voting rights activists "a bunch of
niggers . . . chimpanzees." On another occasion, he wrote the Justice Department
complaining about its "lousy" rights cases. On a third occasion, he threatened to jail U.S.
Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach for contempt, for refusing to process peijury
indictments against two Negro witnesses. Thus, appalled civil rights advocates attributed
his ruling to Mississippi justice, which rarely punished a white man for the murder o f a
black man. In this case, an unspoken understanding seemed to exist between Cox and the
sheriffs office, one which stated that conspiring to commit murder would not be
punished in civil rights cases. Furthermore, such collaboration undoubtedly contributed to
the common impression—described by journalists, civil rights workers, and federal
government officials alike—that southern sheriffs and other local law enforcement
officers could escape conviction, even in the face of a murder charge. 86
The Justice Department appealed Cox’s ruling to the United States Supreme
Court. Meanwhile, Price and Rainey became Klan celebrities. In the summer o f 1965,
shortly after civil rights workers marched from Philadelphia to the bumed-out Mt. Zion
Methodist Church in commemoration of the first anniversary of Schwemer, Goodman,
86
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and Chaney’s deaths, the United Klans opened its recruiting campaign with an evening
rally near Meridian. Over a thousand people attended, including Sheriff Rainey. Wearing
his uniform and bullet-studded gunbelt, he received a standing ovation as he mounted the
speakers' platform to make a brief speech. "I'm glad to be here and to see these fine
people here . . . I can tell you I met some of the finest people anywhere in the Klan this
afternoon and tonight." Not quite two weeks later, Imperial Wizard Robert Shelton held
another meeting in Greenville, Mississippi, and Rainey and Price attended and were
officially introduced.87
Confident that he stood little chance o f being tried, much less convicted, Price
declared himself a candidate for the office of Neshoba County sheriff. In an
advertisement in the Neshoba Democrat, Price revealed his intention to follow the law
enforcement style of Sheriff Rainey, whose four-year term would expire in December
1967. Price assured voters that "it will be in the future, as it has been in the past, my
earnest desire to uphold the law, regardless o f whether agitators are o f national
prominence or n o t . . . I think my actions in the past prove that I want our way o f life
upheld whenever it is attacked by outsiders who have no real interest here except to stir
up trouble."88 Despite the conspiracy charge and the FBI's discovery o f rampant civil
rights violations in the sheriffs office, Price still spoke o f "outsiders" and agitators" and
remained determined to uphold Mississippi's unique definition o f law enforcement.
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In March 1966, a full year after Cox dismissed the indictments, the United States
Supreme Court overruled him and reinstated both original indictments. In its opinion in
United States v. Price, et al., the court found that the defendants had conspired to "injure,
oppress, threaten, or intimidate" the three rights workers and had thus denied Goodman,
Schwemer, and Chaney the right to due process as guaranteed under the Fourteenth
Amendment. As Justice Abe Fortas concluded, the conspiracy deprived the three young
men o f this fundamental right, for it “involved releasing the victims from jail at night;
intercepting, assaulting and killing them; and disposing of their bodies. Its purpose was to
punish the victims summarily.” The Supreme Court also argued that the second
indictment, which charged that the “private citizens” who “linked hands” with Rainey
and Price had acted “under the color o f law,” was also accurate, for “to act ‘under color’
of law does not require that the accused be an officer of the State. It is enough that he is a
willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents.”

OQ

On October 7, 1967, over four years after the disappearance of Schwemer,
Chaney, and Goodman, the case against the twenty-one men finally came to trial before
Judge Cox in federal district court in Meridian. Two weeks later, John Doar, head of the
Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division, made closing arguments for the
prosecution. He referred to the murder of the rights workers as a “calculated, cold
blooded plot,” and accused Price of using “the machinery of the law, his office, his
authority, his badge, his uniform. . . “to take, to hold, to capture and kill.” But he
tempered these comments by assuring and reminding the jurors that:
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the federal government is not invading Philadelphia or Neshoba County. . . [but
rather] these defendants are tried for a crime under federal law in a Mississippi
city. . .[This case] is important to the government, it is important to the
defendants, but most of all. . .it’s important to the state of Mississippi. What I say,
what the other lawyers say here today. .. will soon be forgotten, but what you
twelve people do here today will long be remembered.. .

The jury deliberated for a day but was unable to reach a verdict. Judge Cox,
however, refused to declare a mistrial and ordered the jury to deliberate further. On the
morning of October 20, the all-white jury convicted seven o f the eighteen men of
participating in a Klan-led conspiracy to murder the three civil rights workers. They
found Rainey not guilty, but the conviction o f Price and six others marked the first
successful jury conviction o f white law enforcement officials and Klansmen for crimes
against black people or civil rights workers in the history of Mississippi.
One can only speculate as to why the jury returned guilty verdicts. Perhaps Doar,
by subtly reminding them that the nation would remember the outcome o f this trial,
appealed to the jurors’ concern regarding Mississippi’s reputation. Or his assurances that
the federal government was not “invading” their town, a fear that he undoubtedly
capitalized on in his closing argument, made him appear to the jury as less o f an “outside
agitator” and thus more trustworthy. Possibly, however, the jury deserves more credit
than such analysis o f Doar’s diction allows. Perhaps they simply agreed that some of the
defendants should be held accountable under the letter, rather than the color, of the law.
As the New York Times stated, the verdict represented "a measure of the quiet revolution
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that is taking place in southern attitudes—a slow, still faltering but inexorable conversion
to the concept that a single standard of justice must cover whites and Negroes alike."90
Neither Price nor Rainey again worked in any capacity as law enforcement
officers. After serving four years in a northern penitentiary, Cecil Price returned to
Philadelphia in 1974 where he worked various jobs as a surveyor, oil company driver,
and watchmaker. Rainey attained short-lived employment as a security guard in the
Meridian Mall. In 1975, the publicity that accompanied a CBS television drama based on
Don Whitehead’s book, Attack on Terror: The FBI Versus the Ku Klux Klan in
Mississippi, cost Rainey the job. As he complained to a reporter, the "FBI set out to break
me o f everything I had, then keep me down to where I could never get another start, and
they done it."91
In the 1980s, Rainey found another security guard position, this time at a
Mississippi welcome center. The irony is unmistakable: here was one o f the most
infamous figures in Mississippi’s sordid civil rights history manning the state’s official
welcome center. Ironically, too, Rainey’s boss was a black man, a minister in the
Meridian area who resigned from the pastorate rather than heed the will of his
congregation to fire the old white sheriff once linked to the Klan. Rainey now answered
to a member of the race he had once overpowered, and failed to inspire fear among a
black congregation who was no longer afraid to voice their anger.
On November 8, 2002, Rainey died o f throat and tongue cancer, likely a
manifestation o f the fist-sized chaw of Red Man that descriptions andphotographs often
90 New York Times, 22 Oct. 1967, p. 1.
91 Jackson Clarion-Ledger, 16 June 1974, p. 1.
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captured. His death prompted newspapers to retell the story of the Freedom Summer and
the 1964 murder o f the three civil rights workers. Noting that Rainey never expressed
sympathy for the victims, a reporter for the San Antonio Express News editorialized, “If
Rainey wasn’t haunted by Chaney, Goodman, and Schwemer in this life, one wonders if
he’s haunted by them in his afterlife.”92
Rainey’s story is most significant for its illustration of a marked change between
a southern sheriff and his loyal white followers. They were no longer partners in crime,
reciprocating protection from punishment. Perhaps they blamed Rainey for the national
humiliation that the murders and ensuing trials caused, and simply made him the
scapegoat. Or perhaps, as the New York Times believed, a “quiet revolution” was
occurring, and the larger white citizenry no longer wished to support a racist sheriff. Just
as one can only speculate if the jury’s return o f guilty verdicts was due to a concern for
the state’s reputation versus a sincere regard for justice, the precise reason for Rainey’s
ostracized status is certainly open for analysis. What is clear, however, is that Rainey’s
role as a swashbuckling sheriff with a nightstick and six-shooters at his side was over. By
denying him a position in law enforcement, Rainey's constituents gave him the greatest
punishment that a former sheriff could receive.
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Sheriff James G. Clark was a tall, beer-bellied man who sported mirrored
sunglasses and a lapel button proclaiming "Never!” to racial equality. He wore an
Eisenhower jacket and a military-style, gold-braided cap. A nightstick, pistol, and cattle
prod swung from the tooled leather belt that girded his 220 pounds. As the New York
Times observed, “Clark has made a career of keeping Negroes in line.” Abusing his
important role in Dallas County, Alabama, Clark became a symbol of "white man's law,"
"aggression," and "oppression" to Selma blacks in the early 1960s, for he followed the
line o f white supremacy by meeting the clamor for voting rights and racial equality with
violence and arrests.93
In February 1963, the Student Nonviolating Coordination Committee (SNCC)
chose to concentrate its voting rights campaign in the "Black Belt," an area o f dark and
fertile prairie land covering about fifteen counties between the coastal plains and the
piedmont o f northern Alabama, that remained one o f the South's major strongholds of
resistance to the civil rights movement. The name o f the region had assumed an
ethnological meaning as well, for the majority o f the people living in the area were the
dark-skinned descendants o f slaves. Like their ancestors, the black population o f the mid
twentieth century Black Belt endured oppression and racism, the remnants o f the Deep
South's violent history. This area o f Alabama was one of the first to call for secession in
1861 and was the part most ravaged by the war and most embittered by Reconstruction.
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The feeling of great injury that characterized the South after Reconstruction never
disappeared here.94
Particularly in Selma, which called itself the "Queen o f the Black Belt" and
served as the stomping grounds for Sheriff Jim Clark, race relations were “trapped in a
time warp.”95 In the history of white supremacy, Selma was distinguished as the home of
the first White Citizens’ Council in Alabama, an organization created to promote
defiance o f the Supreme Court’s 1954 ruling in Brown v. Board o f Education, which
made “separate but equal” unconstitutional. According to Southern Christian Leadership
Conference program director Andrew Young, Selma was “an insulated, isolated, hermetic
southern town . . . that looked like it still belonged to the nineteenth century. It was
nothing but a bridge and a main street. Large warehouses lined the river, empty reminders
of the days of King Cotton.” The Confederate flag that flew over the Edmund Pettus
Bridge—the eastern entrance into Selma—provided further indication that many features
o f the old order o f antebellum life still remained.96
Just as past and present seemed inseparable, so too did public and private law
enforcement. Clark raised a volunteer mounted “posse” o f white citizens, which included
both Selma’s poor whites and its wealthy businessmen and landowners, to lead to racial
trouble spots around the state. In defense of white supremacy, Clark went to Montgomery
during the bus boycott and to Tuscaloosa where he backed Governor Wallace’s fight

94 John Herbers, “Black Belt of Alabama is a Stronghold of 19th Century Racism,” New York Times, 14
Feb. 1965, A-70; Jules Loh, “Most Southern Place in Deep South,” Birmingham News, 9 Feb. 1965, p. 13.
95 Andrew Young, An Easy Burden: The Civil Rights Movement and the Transformation o f America
(New York: Harper Collins, 1996), 341.
96

Young, 339-40.

74

against desegregation at the University of Alabama. Clark and his posse possessed a
"Gestapo-like control" over the black population. With guns, clubs, and cattle prods in
hand, the sheriff and his deputized citizenry kept them in perpetual fear. SNCC called
Selma a "town in a reign o f terror." Martin Luther King, Jr. noted that a "carefully
cultivated mystique" existed behind the power and brutality of Clark and his men, and the
Alabama Journal observed that “the sheriff is the chief law enforcement officer by law,
and Clark has certainly played the part.” Even young people feared the local sheriffs
authority. Black children played a game called "Jim Clark and Negro"—"I'll be Jim
Clark, you be the Negro. I'll hit you on the head, you fall down."97
Southern racial history suggested that if Selma was a stronghold o f nineteenth
century beliefs, its chief law enforcement officer would be as well. Clark, like his
constituents, believed that blacks were by nature inferior. He was determined to maintain
white supremacy, and he did not hide his racial views. Commenting on his confrontation
with a civil rights worker, Clark noted that "one of the first things I ever learned was not
to hit a nigger with your fist because his head is too hard." And when a reporter asked
him if a particular female defendant was married, the sheriff replied, "She's a nigger
woman and she hasn't got a Miss or a Mrs. in front of her name."98
Clark's reputation was well known to civil rights leaders, which was largely why
SNCC and members of the SCLC began their Alabama voter registration drive in Selma.
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Andrew Young referred to the vestiges of slavery still apparent in the Queen o f the Black
Belt. He noted that though Selma was “a brutal city in the past,” it “suddenly has become
calm. Actually, this is just a sophisticated source of oppression. They put on a nice, polite
image but keep you enslaved." Through denial of the ballot, Selma's black population
remained at the mercy o f local government officials like Clark, who was twice elected to
four-year terms in Dallas County by an electorate that included only 335 out o f 15,000
voting-age blacks."
Civil rights activists thus arrived in Selma hoping to bait the easily-angered
sheriff into "headline-catching" episodes that would spur the federal government to create
more effective voting rights laws. They believed that they had a “ready-made situation”
in Selma, for Clark and his posse would easily and violently respond to local blacks’
voter registration attempts.100 Young described Clark as “a prototype o f a southern white
sheriff. .. he believed that Selma’s black population could be suppressed and controlled
through force.” Clark’s behavior was “akin” to that o f the antebellum sheriffs and slave
patrols who punished slaves for escaping from their plantations, for Clark and his posse
punished those who tried to enter the courthouse.101
Ironically, a reciprocal relationship existed between Clark and Selma's black
community. Like a white community that expected its sheriff to acquiesce or participate
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in extralegal violence, the black community of Selma similarly expected Clark to respond
violently to civil rights agitation. But while a white community, in return for their
sheriffs cooperation, protected him from the law, civil rights activists wanted the
opposite: attention from the national press that would expose Clark's racist actions and
bring federal intervention. With the ballot achieved, Selma's blacks would then have
enough votes to get rid o f Jim Clark.
From February 1963 until the spring o f 1964, civil rights activists had difficulty
achieving either o f these goals, owing in part to the failure of the South's judiciary system
to respond to the sheriffs violent methods o f law enforcement. Throughout the spring of
1963, SNCC's monthly Voters' League clinics drew an average of forty people, and by
mid-June they drew seven hundred to a mass rally. This activity angered Clark, who
subjected the civil rights workers to a series of harassing arrests. At the end o f June, the
Justice Department filed a request for an ex parte restraining order against Sheriff Clark
and the other officials involved, but Federal District Judge Daniel Thomas denied the
request the same day. By early October Clark and his men had arrested over 300 blacks
attempting to register to vote. When several hundred blacks lined up at the Dallas County
courthouse on October 7, Sheriff Clark and his deputies harassed the applicants and
prevented workers from bringing them food and water. A month later, the Justice
Department again moved for a temporary restraining order to prohibit Sheriff Clark and
other local officials from interfering with the voting rights of black citizens or attempting
to intimidate black voter applicants. However, just as district Judge Harold Cox had
dismissed the second set of indictments against lawmen Price and Rainey in Mississippi,
ruling that they would only be tried on a misdemeanor count, Judge Thomas ruled in
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favor of the sheriffs department. In a decision entered in March 1964, Thomas decreed
that no abuse of powers had occurred and denied the request for an injunction against
Clark and other local officials.
As a teacher for the Dallas County Voters' League said, "The law has become
very lawless." Although apart from weekly mass meetings, no civil rights activities
occurred in Selma in the first half o f 1964, the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
spurred a reappearance o f rights activity in Selma in early July. On July 5, Clark, his
volunteer mounted posse, and highway patrolmen used tear gas and nightsticks after
blacks allegedly hurled a volley o f rocks and bricks at officers. Blacks denied that they
threw anything to provoke the attack. On July 6, forty-nine blacks were arrested as they
paraded on the steps o f the courthouse. Noting that he arrested the men for violating city
laws that prohibited demonstrations while the court was in session, Clark and his men,
armed with guns, nightsticks, and electric cattle prods, marched the blacks five blocks to
jail. On the ninth, the trio of Clark, Selma Mayor Chris Heinz, and State Circuit Judge
James Hare combined to put a damper on civil rights activities in Selma. Responding to a
complaint by Clark and Heinz, Hare issued an injunction that forbade public gatherings
o f more than three people. Like its counterpart in Mississippi, the Dallas County sheriffs
office enjoyed the support of local government officials for these racist actions. 102 As
SNCC chairman John Lewis noted, Judge Hare was an extension of Governor Wallace,
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and Jim Clark was an extension of Hare. They represented the “chain of command” that
civil rights workers faced in Selma.103
Martin Luther King, Jr. and the SCLC used these continued setbacks to highlight
the ways in which black voting rights were being denied in the Dallas County seat. King
candidly admitted that the success of the voting rights campaign depended in large part
on provoking violence. The choice o f Selma as the focal point for the SCLC’s 1965
voting rights effort represented an evolution in the group’s approach to violence. The
Albany campaign had revealed the limits o f nonviolent persuasion, for Police Chief
Laurie Pritchett had studied King’s philosophy o f provocation and strategically
responded to the demonstrations with his own nonviolence in order to avoid attracting
national attention to Albany, thus thwarting King’s voting rights goals. Birmingham,
conversely, had indicated that white violence redounded to the movement's favor. King
believed that Sheriff Clark, like Birmingham’s aggressive police chief "Bull" Connor,
would prove an unwitting ally.104
King arrived in early January 1965 and immediately organized the black
community for marches to the Dallas County courthouse in Selma. By the end o f the
month, Sheriff Clark had arrested nearly two thousand demonstrators and had held his
temper. Although Clark and his posse occasionally lost control and began to shove and
kick some o f the demonstrators, they avoided the type of excessive violence that would
attract a national audience. As one participant observed, Clark simply "looked like a
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caged tiger, stalking about, fuming." Although King had watched Clark drag a woman
roughly for half a block before shoving her into the patrol car, calling it "one o f the most
brutal and unlawful acts I have seen an officer commit," Clark's violent gestures failed to
generate the kind of national publicity that could spur the federal government into
action.105
However, with each passing day, and with each organized civil rights
demonstration, Clark's hostility increased. On January 22, the Reverend Frederick Reese
gathered 125 black teachers in Brown Chapel before their planned march to the
courthouse. He spoke o f the importance of the march:

The sheriff will think twice about mistreating you. You are teachers in the public
school system o f the State o f Alabama, but you can't vote. We're going to see
about that today. If they put us in jail, there won't be anybody to teach the
children and Clark knows if they're not in school, then they'll be out in the streets.
And he doesn't want that.106

His prediction proved at least partially correct. Clark used his nightstick to push and prod
the marchers back from the door, barking, "You can't make a playhouse out of the
corridors o f this courthouse. Some o f you think you can make it a Disneyland." School
superintendent Joseph Pickard and members o f the board o f education stood by, urging
the marchers to return to the church, and asking the sheriff to keep his patience. Clark did
not entirely lack the usual backup from local officials, however. E.A. Stewart, chairman
o f the Selma schoolboard, warned the teachers that "the sheriff is custodian o f this
105 Sheyann Webb and Rachel West Nelson, Selma, Lord, Selma: Girlhood Memories o f the Civil-Rights
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courthouse and he has been most forbearing." For over fifteen minutes, the teachers
waited to be arrested, while Clark uttered warnings and made threatening gestures with
his club. After repeated attempts to enter, and repeated retreats in the face of Clark's billy
club, the teachers returned to the church. The television cameras o f NBC captured it all
for the nation.107
The next day, Judge Thomas, diverging significantly from his former rulings,
ordered Clark to stop interfering with black voter applicants and warned that "violence on
either side will not be tolerated." Clark did not heed Thomas's order. During another long
wait on the sidewalk outside the courthouse, a "large" black woman named Annie Lee
Cooper became angry when Clark ordered King to stop talking to reporters and return to
the long line that had formed by the curb. Cooper sent Sheriff Clark reeling with a
powerful punch to the head. Three deputies then "grabbed her and wrestled her to the
ground, and in the flailing, kicking struggle that followed Sheriff Clark clubbed her. She
was then taken off to jail in two pairs of handcuffs with a wound over her right eye." The
most important result o f this clash was the newspaper coverage that it received. In
addition to a half-page spread showing two deputies holding Mrs. Cooper's hands while
Clark bent over her with a nightstick, was Times reporter John Herbers' vivid description
of the scuffle. "She put up quite a battle as the officers seized her and threw her to the
ground. 'I wish you would hit me, you scum,' she snapped at the sheriff. He then brought
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his billyclub down on her head with a whack that was heard throughout the crowd
gathered in the street."108
On February 4, perhaps as a result o f Selma's continued presence on the nightly
news, civil rights leaders won a small victory. Judge Thomas ordered a speedup of the
registration process in Dallas County, insisting that the registration board stop using a
literacy test set up by the State Supreme Court, process at least one hundred applications
each day it sat, and refrain from failing applicants on technicalities. Rights leaders
expressed disappointment, however, not jubilation, for the racist actions of the county’s
chief law enforcement officer made Judge Thomas’ order virtually meaningless. As King
observed, "We feel we can have little faith in this, unless something can be done about
Jim Clark. Until he is removed, the evils o f Selma will not be removed." The Reverend
Andrew Young echoed King's sentiment, noting that "this kind of order without some
citation o f Jim Clark is going to be hard to sell to the people."109
Although the campaign’s success in part required the nation’s recognition of
blacks’ struggle to vote in Alabama, registration of voters was the ultimate goal.
Therefore, SCLC considered looking for another town in the Black Belt to rejuvenate its
efforts, as the drive had so far resulted in the arrest o f over three thousand people in
Dallas County rather than an equal number o f registered voters. But Clark came through
for the civil rights workers in Selma. As a staff member o f SCLC said, “Every time it
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appears that the movement is dying out, Sheriff Clark comes to our rescue.” On February
10, he force-marched 165 teenagers over two miles from the courthouse to the
countryside. Although some cheerily sang freedom songs, including one o f the favorites,
"I love Jim Clark in my heart," others dropped from exhaustion or followed the posse
impassively. One rights activist observed their return: "Others were straggling in, and
some of them vomited. I watched with wide eyes. They had been made to run until they
were sick." Sheriff Clark's tactics angered the black community. That night, crowds
packed two black churches, listening to one speaker after another berate Sheriff Clark.
King reiterated his earlier comment: "Selma will never get right and Dallas County will
never get right until we get rid of Jim Clark. We are disgusted with brutality, and with
terroristic methods, and with Jim Clark's downright meanness in the handling of the boys
and girls in our community."110
The climax of the Selma campaign occurred on March 7, a date that journalists
would immortalize as Bloody Sunday. During the last week of February, a state trooper
in nearby Marion seriously wounded Jimmie Lee Jackson, a black teenager. He died eight
days later. Although the incident failed to generate much national publicity, SCLC and
the NAACP pledged that Jackson’s death would encourage their continued pressure upon
Congress to adopt a new voting law providing for federal registrars in areas like Selma.
As Roy Wilkins, executive director of the NAACP, wrote in a telegram to Jackson’s
mother, “We can no longer leave to .. . sheriffs such as Jim Clark determination of
registration procedures and the continued denial o f franchise.” Despite Governor George
110 New York Times, 17 Feb. 1965, p. 35; Newsweek, 22 Feb. 1965, p. 24; Webb and Nelson, 67; Roy
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Wallace's order against a march, SCLC planned a fifty-mile walk from Selma to the state
capitol in Montgomery to protest Jackson's death and Selma's continued use of violence
to block voter registration. In the early afternoon of March 7, Hosea Williams addressed
the hundreds of marchers gathered inside Brown's Chapel, impressing upon them the
importance o f provoking violence while not participating in it. "We must pray that we are
attacked, for if the sheriff does nothing to stop us, if the state troopers help us accomplish
our long walk, if the governor meets us on the steps of the C apitol. . . then we have lost.
We must pray . . . for the white man to commit violence, and we must not fight back!"111
SCLC's Williams and SNCC's John Lewis led the six hundred marchers in a long,
double-file column from Brown's Chapel toward the Edmund Pettus Bridge. They walked
on Selma's streets without interference, but when they reached the crest of the bridge, as
one participant recalled, the line o f about fifty helmeted Alabama state troopers spanning
the width o f the bridge "looked like a blue picket fence." Behind the troopers were
several dozen more o f Clark's posse, about fifteen o f them on horseback. A hundred or so
white spectators looked on from the sides o f the highway. When the column o f marchers
refused to move after Major John Cloud’s order for dispersal, the troopers advanced. As
the Times reported, the "flying wedge" of troopers "swept ten or twenty blacks to the
ground screaming, arms and legs flying." White spectators cheered the officials' efforts,
mounted posse members galloped into the retreating mass flailing their nightsticks, and
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troopers released tear gas. The lawmen, both on foot and on horseback, chased the blacks
back into the black neighborhood and housing project adjacent to Brown's Chapel.112
That night, about six hundred blacks met again in Brown's Chapel. Williams told
the group that he had fought in World War II and had been captured by the Germans, but
he added "that the Germans never were as inhuman as the state troopers of Alabama."
However, SCLC leaders still planned to attempt the trek to Montgomery once more on
March 9. As one participant recalled:
When I first went into that church that evening those people sitting there were
beaten, I mean their spirit, their will was beaten. But when that singing started, we
grew stronger. Each one o f us said to ourselves that we could go back out there
and face the tear gas, face the horses, face whatever Jim Clark could throw at
us.113
Bloody Sunday garnered the public attention and created the public reaction that
civil rights leaders had sought. The nation not only saw photographs o f the violence
inflicted upon peaceful marchers, but read with shock of southern lawmakers, journalists,
and the general public's defense o f their region and its method of law enforcement.
Alongside pictures of injured marchers, gas-masked state troopers, and club and whipwielding posse members were words o f support from both local and state government
officials who defended the troopers' actions and denied that Alabama was blameworthy
or unique in its handling o f racially-charged situations. Claiming that Selma was a city
"operating within the law," Selma's Mayor Joe Smitherman noted that when outside
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agitators came in saying "they're the law," a loss of democracy occurred.114 Following the
events o f March 7, he told the press that he wanted President Johnson to urge the
"outsiders" to leave Selma. Smitherman later recalled, "This whole civil rights thing was
like a war, like we were being invaded." Just as Alabamians and other southerners had
felt under siege during the North's occupation of the post-Civil War South, their mid
twentieth century counterparts similarly felt as though northern "invaders" were again
attempting to refashion the South's social, political, and economic order. Andrew Young
noticed this inability o f Selma’s citizens’ to separate the antebellum past from the
twentieth century present, commenting that the Union Army’s 1865 destruction of Selma
was “frequently mentioned when we [SCLC and SNCC] were there, as if we were the
second coming o f the Union Army.”115
Even further up the government totem pole, Governor Wallace denied that
Alabama state troopers and sheriffs deputies used unnecessary force in routing the
marchers and warned that if the rights activists attempted another march on Tuesday,
there would be no change in police tactics. Continuing his defense of the troopers'
actions, he argued that it was probable that the police's billy club and tear gas assault
actually saved the lives o f some o f the marchers by turning them away from the angry
white spectators and back toward Selma. Just as Mississippi Governor Paul Johnson
argued when the three rights workers disappeared in Philadelphia, Wallace invoked a
comparison with the North. Calling the national press's reporting o f the Sunday march
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"distorted," Wallace countered that "not nearly as many were hurt as were hurt in similar
occurrences in other states, including those in the North."116
Watching Selma's racial activity from Washington, two o f Alabama's
congressional representatives praised Governor Wallace and state law enforcement
officers for the "admirable manner" and "efficiency" in which they handled the "trying
situation foisted upon Alabama by the un-American actions o f this mob." Furthermore,
they congratulated those black citizens who "recognized these outside agitators for what
they are and remained loyal to their home state and its institutions." As the NAACP’s
Roy Wilkins appropriately remarked in response to statements such as these, it was
useless to appeal to Alabama authorities when those same "state people" had allowed
Selma blacks to be "ridden over and beaten and their women dragged around."

i t n

Not surprisingly, public opinion, as expressed in newspaper editorials across
Alabama, agreed with the viewpoint of many o f the state's government officials. Many
Selma citizens, in the words of one resident, hoped that "Dr. King will leave town and let
us deal with the problem in our own way." They knew that one way to ensure King's
departure was to respond peacefully to the rights' marches, thereby keeping television
cameras and journalists from recording acts of racist brutality that would prompt the
federal government's "invasion" o f their state. One editorial bemoaned the fact that
Bloody Sunday gave "the ruthless King everything he could possibly have wanted and a
thousand times more than he expected." Therefore, while Selma’s white citizens
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"abhorred" the civil rights movement and feared legislation that would infringe upon their
voter registration system, they expressed concern over Alabama’s reputation, and asked
Governor Wallace to "take steps to cool things off." In addition, local editorials ui:ged
Clark to adopt the "courage o f restraint," and avoid the "hasty swinging of clubs and
lashes" that would make new rights legislation a "dead certainty." Although they granted
that Clark was in a "most difficult spot" and that he and his deputies had "no choice other
than to try to enforce the laws on our books," they suggested that he avoid "excessive
force." Again, they blamed the rights activists for provoking such violence, chastising
them for defying Wallace's order and for assuming that deprivation of civil rights allowed
them "unlimited privilege to disturb the peace."118
Clark, as he had since the rights activists' arrival in Selma, remained committed to
thwarting voter registration attempts and refused to accept that his arrests of and brutality
toward rights workers accounted for their continued presence in Selma. He noted that he
had to move his family into the quarters at the county jail owing to telephone threats, but
he simultaneously insisted that the races coexisted harmoniously in Alabama.
Furthermore, although he ignored Ku Klux Klan activity, his own violent methods o f law
enforcement, and the fact that at one time Selma had the largest Citizens Council in
Alabama, he mimicked many of his constituents and other local and state officials in
blaming "outsiders" for the assaults upon and arrests of civil rights activists. In other
words, civil rights leaders, whom Clark called "morally depraved, personally degenerate,
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and intellectually dishonest," provoked violence, and caused "the situation to become
very tense."119
Clark viewed Martin Luther King as the main source o f Selma's racial troubles,
arguing that King did more to "destroy the relations between the white man and Negro in
Selma and Dallas County than any other one thing that has happened in the last 100
years." He was an "outside agitator" who "came in to stir up trouble" and to "grab for
power" because he had a “personal vendetta” against Clark. In a joint statement printed in
the Selma Times-Journal, Clark and Mayor Smitherman wrote that the "outside agitators
are interested in Selma only as a focal point for propaganda .. . and they neither want nor
will accept a solution to our present crisis." In addition, the two local officials urged that
the "entire community must stand firm ly. .. and not yield to or compromise with
unlawful pressure or unruly demonstrations." The national press was also blameworthy,
as Clark argued that they embellished stories with "sensationalism and unadulterated
fiction," presenting "colorful and imaginative" accounts o f activities in Selma that were
creative, not objective.120
Outside o f Alabama, however, newspapers and various individuals and
organizations placed blame on Clark and other state and local officials, expressing shock
and indignation at Selma's methods of law enforcement. The New York Times, for
example, editorialized that Governor Wallace, "by authorizing state troopers, sheriffs
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deputies and members of a volunteer posse to attack a group of private citizens, has
written another shameful page in his own record and in the history of Alabama." Quoting
the reporters' vivid descriptions of the events o f March 7, the editors noted that "if this is
described as law enforcement, it is misnamed. It is nothing more nor less than race
conscious officialdom run amuck." The Chicago Tribune called the actions of the
"Alabama gestapo" a "national disgrace," and the Washington Post found it "simply
inconceivable that in this day and age, the police who have sworn to uphold the law and
protect the citizenry could resort, instead, to violent attacks upon them."121
As forty-three members of the House and seven members of the Senate offered
harsh condemnations o f the tactics and weapons used by the Alabama lawmen and called
for voting rights legislation, civic and religious organizations like the Anti-Defamation
League and the National Catholic Conference for Interracial Justice also reacted publicly
to news o f the attack. Invoking the now familiar reference to Nazi Germany, the latter
organization said that the behavior o f the Alabama state troopers "recalls the days of the
Nazi Storm Troopers," and the Anti-Defamation League called "the shocking spectacle of
helmeted and gas-masked troopers attacking defenseless Negro American citizens
gathered for a peaceable demonstration . . . a blot on our country's record." In addition,
several governors, obviously holding dramatically different racial views than their
southern counterpart, criticized the mishandling of Sunday's march. Some wrote Wallace,
disputing his "improper" and "shameful" method of handling the demonstration, while
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others participated in marches protesting Selma's Sunday events or asked their state
*

♦

•

senators to pass a congressional resolution condemning the police brutality in Selma.

122

"Bloody Sunday" caught the attention of President Johnson as well. Ten days
after the event, Johnson addressed Congress and the nation via radio and television. He
had been preparing to send a voting rights bill to Congress, but as a result of Selma's
violent Sunday march, Johnson felt increased pressure to prevent further discrimination
against the potential black voter. Comparing Selma to Concord, Lexington, and
Appomattox, significant "turning points in man’s unending search for freedom," he noted
that there would be no "delay, hesitation, or compromise" in eliminating illegal
restrictions used to deny blacks' right to vote. He asked Congress to join him in "working
long hours, nights, and weekends to pass this bill," for "outside this chamber is the
outraged conscience o f a nation, the grave concern of many nations, and the harsh
judgment o f history on our acts." As the Selma Times-Journal observed, discrimination
might have continued if Governor Wallace had not told his state troopers to use any
"necessary force" to stop the march, but that force unleashed such a "storm of protest"
that "voting in the South will probably never be the same again and the cause of civil
rights and desegregation has been pushed ahead by years."
Bloody Sunday led directly to the Voting Rights Act of 1965. On August
6, 1965, Johnson fulfilled his promise and signed the act into law, effectively opening up
the polls to blacks throughout the South for the first time since the disfranchisement o f
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the late nineteenth century. In addition to suspending literacy tests and other restrictive
subterfuges, the act provided for federal registrars and poll watchers in those "hard-core”
counties where the Census determined that “less than 50 percentum of the persons of
voting age residing therein were registered.”124 The 1965 Voting Rights Act did not mark
the end o f the civil rights movement, but the beginning o f a "maturation process" for
1a r

southern blacks.

Leadership and participation in the movement had left them well

armed to continue the pressure against the vestiges o f white supremacy.
This was nowhere truer than in Dallas County, Alabama. A year after Bloody
Sunday, almost eleven thousand blacks were registered to vote. With the power o f the
ballot now in hand, Selma's black community was determined to oust Sheriff Jim Clark
from office. In the spring of 1966, Wilson Baker, Selma's former public safety director,
ran against Clark for the office of sheriff. Not surprisingly, Clark remained determined to
fight the black vote until the bitter end. The race had prompted a heavy turnout o f black
voters who relished the opportunity to vote against Clark. A close tally resulted, and
Clark attempted to have the ballots cast in six largely black precincts thrown out on the
grounds that irregularities had occurred at those polling places. As had happened
throughout the civil rights activity in Selma, local government supported the sheriff. The
county Democratic Executive Committee, which was chaired by a founder of the White
Citizens’ Council, voted to accept Clark's claims and to disqualify the challenged black
ballots. However, the Justice Department protected black interests, and in a federal
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hearing, Judge Thomas concluded that Clark's and the committee's claims of irregularities
concerning the six black boxes lacked any validity. The votes were included in the final
tally, black voters thus providing Baker’s margin o f victory over Clark.
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Two years later Jim Clark's political career ended when he drew only 18 percent
of the vote in a statewide race for the chairmanship o f the Alabama Public Service
Commission. At the beginning of the voting rights drive in Selma, one civil rights activist
commented that registering to vote was not the immediate issue for blacks; the problem
was just gaining entrance to Clark’s “personal domain”—the Dallas County courthouse
where all voters were registered.127 By achieving the black vote, rights activists not only
solved this problem, but gave blacks an opportunity to vote against racist sheriffs like Jim
Clark.
As Selma civil rights activist J.L. Chestnut observed in his memoir, Clark’s
“swagger” disappeared with his political career. No longer equipped with the physical
accoutrements o f the sheriffs office that provided a material display of his power and
status, Clark’s presence in Selma inspired nothing but indifference:
I was standing outside Sam Washington’s tailor shop . .. when Clark drove by,
very slowly, looking from side to side . . . He was driving an ordinary car and
wearing civilian clothes, somewhat unkempt. Black people, as usual, were lined
up like flies, drinking whiskey, keeping up noise, and having fun. There’d been a
time when Clark’s presence would have cleared the sidewalk .. . That morning
they just stood looking as he drove slowly down the street. . . He obviously
wanted us to see him. He seemed to want some reaction, but all he got was “Hell,
there goes Clark.” As he looked over at us, I thought I saw in his face a sad
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recognition that he was no longer in charge. Black people had not gone anywhere.
We were still here, and we didn’t give a damn about him anymore.
According to Chestnut, Selma’s white community ignored Clark as well, making him the
“scapegoat” for the city’s racial troubles.129 Perhaps the race for the chairmanship o f the
Public Service Commission affords the best illustration o f Clark’s ostracized status, even
beyond the borders o f Selma. Ironically, the political voices of black and white
communities across Alabama united in Clark’s final campaign for public office, for both
races used the ballot to remind Clark of his failure to subvert the voting rights drive. If, as
John Lewis noted, Clark “ran the county like a king” during his tenure as sheriff,
Chestnut’s observation reveals that the Voting Rights Act effectively exiled Clark from
his kingdom.130

128 J.L. Chestnut and Julia Cass, Black in Selma: The Uncommon Life ofJ.L. Chestnut, Jr. (New York:
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1990), 241-2.
129

Chestnut and Cass, 242.

130

Lewis, 306.

94

PART IV
THE COLOR OF THE LAW

From Ida B. W ells’s observation in 1892 that southern sheriffs typically submitted
to mob rule to the Southern Regional Council’s description of them in 1964 as “sadism
hiding behind a badge,” the central— and constant— role of sheriffs in southern racial
violence becomes abundantly clear.131 Through studying sheriffs like Jeremiah Shipp,
Lawrence Rainey, and Jim Clark, we hear the voices of members o f the white community
who applauded the racist views of their chief law enforcement officer, the voices of local
government officials who either ignored or condoned the actions of a racist sheriff, and
finally, the voices of the nation, as they expressed shock at the South’s perverted
definition of justice. Once the black community regained the ballot in 1965, their voices,
spoken through the ballot, illustrated the southern sheriff’s sudden impotence, as sheriffs
like Jim Clark found themselves voted out o f office by the very race they had once
overpowered. Thus, to study the southern sheriff reveals not only the white community’s
racial attitudes, but also the strides made possible by the Voting Rights Act.
In 1967, two years after the passage o f the Act, Walter Calhoun, a black man, ran
for sheriff of Wilcox County, Alabama. His candidacy effectively illustrates that the
terror and violence endured by voting rights activists in communities like Selma and
Philadelphia actually yielded a positive result. The seemingly inseparable relationship
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between the southern sheriff and racial injustice was coming to an end. Unlike other civil
rights acts that only slowly changed southern life, the Voting Rights Act had an
immediate impact. However, though Wilcox was able to run for sheriff, the white citizens
of Wilcox reacted with shock to the news o f Calhoun's candidacy. This was a county that
had refused to sign a school desegregation plan as required by the federal government,
insisting that black and white children should not sit as equals in the classroom. A black
man running for sheriff was even worse than desegregated schools, for if elected,
Calhoun would not only be an equal, but a superior, with the power to question, arrest,
and even imprison whites. Furthermore, the white population's consternation was only
increased by the knowledge that local blacks had the ability to elect Calhoun, when only
•

*

1

ten months earlier, not a single black was registered to vote in the county.

^ 9

Until Calhoun filed for candidacy, the black community did not think much
would come o f the new Voting Rights Act. After all, Congress had passed a law in 1964
saying that restaurants and hotels must be desegregated, but no black person in the county
had set foot inside these white establishments, except to cook or clean. Calhoun lost the
election to incumbent "Lum" Jenkins, who had served as sheriff of Wilcox County for
twenty-seven years. However, in Macon County, Alabama, a center of black intellectual
life and home o f the Tuskegee Institute, Lucius Amerson ran for sheriff and won. While
undoubtedly helped by the fact that Macon County’s population in the 1960s was 84
percent black, Amerson’s victory earned him the distinction of becoming the first black
man to hold the southern sheriffs office since Reconstruction. The Voting Rights Act
gave black men like Calhoun and Amerson the opportunity to run and black citizens the
132
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opportunity to visit the ballot box. As Jack Rosenthal, Special Assistant to the Attorney
General, wrote in 1966 to Clifford Alexander, Special Counsel to President Lyndon
Johnson, the vote was proving to be a powerful instrument o f reform against “Jim Crow
justice.”133
Indeed, the bill dismantled the legal restraints that prevented black southerners
from voting, and allowed them to influence the choice of sheriff. Since Calhoun’s
candidacy, the demographics of the southern sheriff s office have changed dramatically,
and newspaper headlines have acknowledged the South’s “new” brand of sheriffs. In
1992, the nation’s first black female sheriff, Jackie Barrett, was elected sheriff o f Fulton
County, Georgia. Before the election, headlines such as “Black Woman Set to Break the
Redneck-Sheriff Ceiling” and “Black Woman Candidate Tries to Debunk Image of
Southern Sheriff’ addressed her “far from stereotype” appearance. Increasingly, women
have entered the office; nine o f the nation's twenty-four female sheriffs are in the South.
Snapshots of four sheriffs' departments —in Fulton and Monroe Counties, Georgia; in
Davidson County, Tennessee, and in Duval County, Florida --illustrate how much this
most southern of political offices has changed in the last forty years. In 1960, only two o f
the sheriffs in those counties had college degrees, and all four were white men. Today all
four sheriffs have undergraduate and master’s degrees. Davidson and Fulton counties
have female sheriffs, one o f them black. Duval County has an African-American man as
sheriff.134
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Headlines also acknowledge other significant improvements within the southern
sheriffs office. In 1999, John William King went on trial in Jasper, Texas, for dragging a
black man, James Byrd, Jr., to death behind a pickup truck. Under the headline “Deputies
Can Change,” a reporter for the San Antonio Express-News happily observed that two
Jasper County sheriffs deputies embraced after hearing that King was sentenced to
death. This was certainly a sign o f change, the reporter noted, for “it wasn’t too long ago
that [southern] law enforcement officials not only did not celebrate the punishment of
racial violence, but actively took part in the violence.”

t -1 C

But as this reporter clarified, King’s conviction did not signal an end to racism in
America. Just as one conviction cannot eradicate four hundred years o f racism and deeply
ingrained prejudice, neither can the Voting Rights Act alone eradicate racism within the
southern sheriffs office. In 1998, Earl Britt, sheriff o f Tensas Parish County, Louisiana,
faced trial for allegedly beating two inmates and lying about it to federal investigators.
Additional witness testimony accused Britt o f observing a deputy strike an inmate and
instructing an employee to “take care of business,” but the presiding U.S. district judge
ruled that these alleged incidents were inadmissible because they did not involve an
assault by Britt himself. Britt was indicted on two counts of violating the civil rights of
black prisoners and ultimately pleaded guilty to both counts. He received a fine and
probation.136
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The National Sheriffs' Association has asked television and movie producers to
stop depicting the southern sheriff as "a fat, tobacco-chewing clown," for this image
implies ignorance and incompetence. The Sheriffs’ Association is undoubtedly aware,
too, that this image implies racism, for during the Civil Rights Movement, overweight,
tobacco-chewing southern sheriffs repeatedly made national news when they violently
thwarted the efforts o f civil rights activists. Although Rainey and Clark provide only two
examples o f southern sheriffs, and egregious ones at that, their racist actions shocked a
nation reading and watching from afar.
Alongside details of Rainey’s involvement in the murder o f the three rights
workers, or Clark’s treatment o f local blacks attempting voter registration, were extensive
physical descriptions of these southern sheriffs. Reporters often introduced the sheriffs
into news stories by noting their weight and their attire, most notably the various
weapons that girded their waistlines. These descriptions helped readers realize that these
armed and “bear-shaped” sheriffs could easily prevent a voter registration line from
moving forward and could easily intimidate the local black population. In fact, Clark and
his posse seemed to be the only obstacle to a voter registration card, and Rainey the
linchpin behind Klan activity in Philadelphia, Mississippi. Photographs gave the words
an unforgettable image, for Rainey, pictured with a tobacco-stuffed cheek, grinning
broadly during his arraignment, and Clark, pictured holding a club in his massive arm and
preparing to strike a black woman lying on the ground, looked undaunted and invincible.
Their physical appearances thus became synonymous with their violent actions—burly
physiques and belt lines bulging with weapons were identifiable evidence of racism and
cruelty.
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The National Sheriffs’ Association might have to wait some time for the image of
the southern sheriff as a “fat, tobacco-chewing clown” to disappear completely. As one
journalist who covered the Tensas Parish case wrote, the stereotype of the racist southern
sheriff persists because it “occurs just often enough to remain believable.”137 The success
of the Voting Rights Act illustrated that one law can have an immediate impact and bring
significant change. But one racist southern sheriff can quickly re-ignite a stereotype to
remind that one law alone cannot change the color of the law.
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